


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# GO WORLD

AUTUMN 1988 NO.53



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## THE FIRST WORLD GO CHAMPIONSHIP THE FUJITSU CUP

A new page is being written in the 3000-year history of the game of go. For the first time a tournament to decide the world's top player: the 1st World Go Championship — The Fujitsu Cup. A long-cherished dream of all go fans is realized as the top professional players from around the world compete to prove themselves the world's strongest player. In sponsoring this tournament, Fujitsu's aim is to deepen the bonds of friendship among the people of the world.

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With the cooperation of: Chinese Weiqi Association, Korean Baduk Association, American Go Association, European Go Federation, Japan Air Lines.



Participants: 16 players from 6 professional bodies

The Nihon Ki-in  
(Japan Go Association)

Koichi KOBAYASHI  
Masao KATO  
Masaki TAKEMIYA  
Chikun CHO

Kaiho RIN

The Kansai Ki-in  
(Western Japan Go Association)

Yutaka SHIRAISHI  
Toshiya IMAMURA

Chinese Weiqi Association

Weiping NIE

Xiaochun MA

Dayuan CAO

Bin YU

Korean Baduk Association  
(Korean Go Association)

Hun Hyun CHO

Bong-Soo SEO

Doo-Jin JANG

American Go Association

Jung Ho LIM

European Go Federation

Ronald SCHLEMPER

1988 Tournament schedule

Round 1: Saturday, April 2

Round 2: Saturday, June 4

Round 3: Saturday, July 2

Playoff for 3rd place: Monday, July 4

Playoff for 1st place: Saturday, September 3

FUJITSU

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*The cover:* An album leaf, painted in watercolors and gold dust, by Sumiyoshi Jokei (ca. 1660). Prince Genji spies on two court ladies playing go, a scene from Lady Murasaki's classic novel *The Tale of Genji*. (Collection of William Pinckard.)

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# Go World News

## International Tournaments

### *Fujitsu Cup*

The first Fujitsu World Champion is Takemiya Masaki, who defeated Rin Kaiho in the final on 3 September. An in-depth report on this tournament begins on page 5.

### *Ing Cup*

Results in the first two rounds, played in Beijing, have produced semifinalists from four countries: Fujisawa Shuko (Japan), Rin Kaiho (Taiwan), Nie Weiping (China), and Cho Hun-hyun (Korea). See the report beginning on page 23.

### *IBM Haya-go Championship*

The third new international tournament this year was won by Ishida Yoshio, who beat Takemiya Masaki in the final, played on 4 October, by half a point. In the semifinals Takemiya beat O Rissei and Ishida beat Oyama. A report on the tournament (written before the final and semifinals were played) begins on page 19.

### **Kobayashi Leads Kato in Meijin Title**

Kobayashi's good form against Kato this year is continuing and in the 13th Meijin title match he has taken a lead of 2-1. If he wins, this will be his third title-match win against Kato in succession. International tournaments aside, Kobayashi has been having one of his best years ever; he went into the Meijin title match with a 29-5 record (a winning percentage of 85.3), which at his level, meeting top players in almost every game, is extraordinary.

Actually, Kato made a good start in the title match by taking the first game and killing a big Kobayashi group in the process. This win greatly encouraged Kato fans because so far this year Kato had only won one game in nine encounters with Kobayashi. It also gave him nine wins in a row in Meijin title matches (he beat both Kobayashi in 1986 and Rin in 1987 four straight), which equalled the record set by Cho Chikun. However, Kobayashi returned the courtesy by killing a large Kato group in the second game (Kato missed a move that would have won a capturing race). He went on to take the third game as well, so he's not giving Kato any help in com-



*Kato makes a good start in the first game of the 13th Meijin title match. He equalled Cho's record of nine wins in a row in Meijin title matches by scoring what was only his second win against Kobayashi this year.*



## 13th Meijin League

| Rank | Player        | R | K | C | I.A. | T | F | I.Y. | O | A | Score | Place |
|------|---------------|---|---|---|------|---|---|------|---|---|-------|-------|
| 1    | Rin Kaiho     | — | 0 | 0 | 1    | 1 | 1 | 1    | 1 | 1 | 6 — 2 | 1     |
| 2    | Kobayashi K.  | 1 | — | 1 | 1    | 1 | 0 | 1    | 0 | 1 | 6 — 2 | 1     |
| 3    | Cho Chikun    | 1 | 0 | — | 1    | 1 | 0 | 1    | 1 | 0 | 5 — 3 | 3     |
| 4    | Ishida Akira  | 0 | 0 | 0 | —    | 0 | 0 | 0    | 0 | 0 | 0 — 8 | —     |
| 5    | Takemiya      | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1    | — | 1 | 0    | 1 | 1 | 4 — 4 | 5     |
| 6    | Fujisawa S.   | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1    | 0 | — | 0    | 1 | 1 | 5 — 3 | 4     |
| 7    | Ishida Yoshio | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1    | 1 | 1 | —    | 0 | 1 | 4 — 4 | 6     |
| 7    | Ohira         | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1    | 0 | 0 | 1    | — | 0 | 3 — 5 | —     |
| 7    | Awaji         | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1    | 0 | 0 | 0    | 1 | — | 3 — 5 | —     |

*Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.*

ing out of his slump.

It's much too early to write Kato off, but, still, who could have predicted a year ago that he would be so jinxed by Kobayashi?

Incidentally, Kato's fuseki has aroused interest in this series. After a gap of quite a few years, he has reverted to the sanren-sei (three star-point stones in a row) pattern that used to be his forte. Perhaps the appearance of the Ishi Press book on this subject revived old memories. Takemiya was heard to express the hope that Kato wasn't infringing his patent.

### *Results to date:*

Game 1 (7, 8 Sept.). Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (20, 21 Sept.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (28, 29 Sept.). Kobayashi (W) won by 2 1/2 points.

### *13th Meijin League*

The final result in the league was a 6-2 tie between Kobayashi and Rin, so a playoff was held on 15 August. Kobayashi won it by 16 1/2 points. Fujisawa Shuko lost his last game to Takemiya, but even if he had won it, he was out of the running for challenger, because in the event of a multiple tie only the two highest-ranked players qualify for a playoff.

### **Kobayashi Takes Gosei from Kato**

The Gosei title match was decided on 28 July, when Kobayashi Koichi beat Kato (playing White, Kato resigned) in the third game to take the title with straight wins. This meant that Kato

was down to two titles, the Meijin and the Oza, and, as reported above, he's having trouble there too. Kato's form this year (he's lost three title matches so far, the Kisei, Judan and Gosei) is a mystifying contrast to last year.

### **Sakata Reaches 13th Kisei Semifinals**

Two stars of the 60's are showing the younger generation that they are not yet ready to be put out to pasture. If Shuko is starring in the international arena, Sakata Eio is enjoying a renaissance in the top Japanese title, the Kisei. After taking second place in the 9-dan section, Sakata has fought his way to the semifinals of the second stage, which decides the Kisei challenger. Here Sakata (age 68) joins three of the top stars of the 80's, Takemiya Honinbo (age 37), Kato Meijin (age 41), and Cho Chikun Judan (age 32). The semifinal pairings are Kato v. Cho (Cho won this game on 6 October) and Sakata v. Takemiya.

Full results in the final section of the second stage are:

*First round.* Sakata b. Sonoda, Kamimura Haruo b. Kada, Takemiya b. Kojima, Yoda b. Otake, Cho b. Kataoka, Ohira b. Komatsu, Rin b. Kudo.

*Second round.* Sakata b. Kamimura, Takemiya b. Yoda, Cho b. Ohira, Kato b. Rin. (As there were 15 players, lots were drawn for one player, who turned out to be Kato, to go directly to the second round.)

### **44th Honinbo League**

The four vacant places in the 44th Honinbo league went to Cho Chikun, Kojima 9-dan, Hane



9-dan, and Kataoka 8-dan. They will join Otake Hideo, Kobayashi Koichi, Yamashiro, and Kato. Cho promptly won his way back into the league after dropping out, but Rin Kaiho, who has been a fixture for two decades, failed to make a comeback.

#### *Takemiya to Challenge Kato Oza*

By defeating Kobayashi Koichi in the final, held on 6 October, Takemiya earned the right to make his first challenge for the Oza title. For a change, Takemiya is doing very well against Kobayashi these days: he also defeated him on 15 September in the quarter-finals of the Tengen tournament, not to mention his victory over him in the Fujitsu Cup. Putting a stop to Kato's great winning run in the Oza title — he's won it six years in a row and eight times in the last nine years — may be a different matter, however.

#### *World's First Woman 9-dan*

It's no secret that the Chinese women players have what it takes to compete at the top level in a predominantly male world. Whatever the reason — the greater social equality between the sexes in mainland China must have something to do with it — fresh confirmation of this has been provided by the promotion of Rui Naiwei to 9-dan in this year's rating tournament. Rui is the first woman ever to reach this exalted level. The top-ranked woman in Japan is Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan, who remains a respectful step behind her husband, Sugiuchi Masao 9-dan.

On the promotion scene in Japan, we have three new 9-dans at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo: Kamimura Haruo, Kataoka Satoshi, and O Rissei. There are now 48 9-dans at the Nihon Ki-in and 28 at the Kansai Ki-in, for a total of 76. That means that about one professional in five is a 9-dan.

*More news on page 63.*

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


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# The First World Go Championship: The Fujitsu Cup

'It's only natural that my "cosmic style" should win the world championship.' This was the prediction that Takemiya made when the Fujitsu Cup, the first-ever world go championship was inaugurated last April. He has been as good as his word, using his inimitable large-moyo strategy to crush Rin Kaiho in the final, played on 3 September in Tokyo. He can now add the prize money of ¥15,000,000 (about \$115,000) to his earnings of ¥25,000,000 from defending the Honinbo title in July.

Actually, Rin was not completely outclassed. Though Takemiya started with his favourite san-ren-sei pattern, Rin took the lead in the fuseki and had a promising game. However, he went wrong in the early fighting in the centre and thereafter Takemiya had things all his own way. Rin had to be content with taking home ¥7,000,000. Since he is doing well in the Ing Cup, the Japanese taxman is looking forward to seeing both of them at the end of the year.

The final was an all-Nihon Ki-in affair: though Rin is a citizen of Taiwan, this tournament is organized according to go bodies, not countries. Both played outstanding go to reach the final. Rin beat Suh Bong-soo, Korea's number two player, in the first round, Cho Chikun in the second, then Nie Weiping in the semifinal; Takemiya had to overcome two top Chinese

players in Tsao Dayuan and Ma Xiaochun before taking some revenge on his nemesis Kobayashi Koichi in the semifinal. Having prevailed against opposition of this class, either player would have made a fitting world champion. As it was, it was Takemiya who rose to the occasion and showed what he had when it came to the crunch. We will feature the final in our next issue; to go on with, we present the semifinals and a couple of interesting games from the first round in this issue.

Preparations for the second Fujitsu Cup are already under way. The number of competitors will be expanded from 16 players from five countries this year to 24 players from seven countries and territories (the latter is the code word indicating that Taiwan will participate). The top three place-getters this year, Takemiya, Rin, and Nie, will be seeded; the other 21 places will be distributed as follows:

|           |                  |
|-----------|------------------|
| Japan: 7  | U.S.A.: 1        |
| China: 5  | Europe: 1        |
| Korea: 4  | South America: 1 |
| Taiwan: 2 |                  |

Next year, the players will be representing their countries, not their associations, so Nihon Ki-in professionals will be free to play for their countries of origin.



*A triumph for the Takemiya cosmic style*



## Semifinal 1: Rin v. Nie

**White:** Nie Weiping 9-dan

**Black:** Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Played on 2 July 1988.

As the first-ever official game between a Taiwanese and a mainland Chinese player, this was an historic encounter. To match the occasion, the game was long and hard-fought, extending to 331 moves and being decided by a point and a half. The result may have surprised some fans, as Rin Kaiho has not been in the news recently on the Japanese tournament scene, but his past results clearly establish him as one of the top players of the postwar period. In fact, for quite a few years, when he held the Meijin title in the mid-60's and early 70's, he was the number one player.

Rin commented before the game that he had hoped to have the chance of playing Nie one day; we can thank Fujitsu for making this interesting pairing possible. Chinese and Taiwanese representatives play each other in the World Amateur Go Championship, but there have been no moves to arrange matches between professionals from the two countries. (Rin, of course, has been a Nihon Ki-in professional since the age of 12. He was actually born in Shanghai, from where his family moved to Taiwan when he was four. He

came to Japan when he was ten.)

The following commentary takes the form of a round-table discussion. Every month the magazine *Igo Club* features an in-depth discussion of the current go scene between Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan and the go writer Murakami Akira, usually with a leading professional as guest. Although *Igo Club* is a magazine for kyu players, the discussion is at times quite high-level; however, it is of a very practical nature, as the aim is to find out what really happened in a game, so we hope the reader will enjoy it.

### Figure 1 (1-44). *Rin's clever sacrifice*

Murakami: White 14 is a little out of the ordinary.

Rin: It took me completely by surprise. Usually you make the pincer.

Yamabe: If, for example, White plays 14 at 'a', Black 21, White 16, Black 18 would follow, which Nie may have disliked. How about this? Rin, did you intend to play this way if White pinned?

Rin: It's quite likely I would have.

Murakami: But what if White played more busily, making the pincer at 23? Would you still answer with the counter-pincer at 21?

Rin: No, I'd probably attach at 'b'.

Yamabe: The contact play at 15 feels good.



*Rin Kaiho puts Yamabe and Murakami in the picture.*







Figure 1 (1-44)



Dia. 1

Rin: I thought that the game wouldn't be bad for me if I could make him answer something here, then press at 16.

Murakami: If Black presses at 16 with 15, White will push down and cut, I suppose.

Yamabe: That would be just what White wants.

Rin: At first I intended to play 19 at 1 in *Dia. 1*, followed by 2 to 13. If next White 'a', Black hanes at 'b'.

Yamabe: Oh, this is also really interesting.

Murakami: The centre would become a black moyo like a Takemiya game.

Rin: I changed my mind and played 19 and 21.


Murakami: Why doesn't Black make a diagonal connection at 27 instead of 21?

Rin: White would peep at 21, making Black heavy. (If White ataris 17, Black will play a ko with 27.)


Yamabe: The result at the top to 41 is good for Black, isn't it?

Rin: Yes. I felt that the opening had gone well for me.

Yamabe: I thought that it was quite favourable for Black.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Rin: White 1 and 2 in *Dia. 2* would have been better than White 24.

Yamabe: I wonder. Black gets a comfortable position when he extends to 4.

Rin: Extending to 29 instead of 26 would be more solid . . .

Yamabe: But that would show poor fighting spirit. You can't help wanting to hane here.

Rin: I welcomed it when White set out to capture me with 30. Because one doesn't want to run out with this black group — one wants to dispose of it as quickly as possible.

Yamabe: The way you sacrificed this group was very clever.

Rin: If White doesn't play 42, being pushed around as in *Dia. 3* is unbearable.

Yamabe: Even after 44 there's a lot of aji left.

Rin: A tewari [removing superfluous stones to evaluate the basic structure] analysis of this result goes like *Dia. 4* (next page). I'll explain why later, but 1 and 3 are sente.


Yamabe: The marked white stones have been turned into terrible moves.

Rin: Black has gained about half a move.


Yamabe: No, it must be more.



Murakami: Rin's sacrifice has given him a lot of thickness. Black's clearly ahead.



*Dia. 4*



*Figure 2 (45-74)*

### Figure 2 (45-74). *Wishful thinking*

Rin: White 48 is natural. If he defended with White 49, Black would get too good a position with Black 'a'. Instead of 53, I should have hane at 1 in *Dia. 5*. If White starts a ladder with 4, I force on the inside at the top with the sequence from 5, then atari at 17.

Yamabe: Oh! If 17 is sente, then Black can escape from the ladder.

Rin: That's right. But I started worrying about something really stupid.


Murakami: What happens if Black escapes from the ladder?

Rin: What I worried about was that after Black 14 in *Dia. 6* White ataris at 15 and captures six stones. But there's no way it could be bad for me if Black captures with 16 and 18. The white stones at 3 and 7 and 11 started looking like thickness to me. (laughter) Nie said that he intended to extend at 'a' with 4 in *Dia. 5*.


Yamabe: I'm sure our readers will enjoy these

two diagrams.

Rin: Actually, with 53 I was thinking of something even greedier. (laughter)



*Dia. 5*



*Dia. 6*

Murakami: What was that?

Rin: Since White has got bad aji around 45, I thought that he might cut at 'b' . . . Then I could escape with 'c' and, after White 'd', try *Dia. 5* . . . That way I take even more profit than in *Dia. 6* . How selfish can you get!

The result of the fight from 54 is reasonable for Black.

### Figure 3 (75-100). *Black keeps his lead.*

Murakami: What would White do if Black played 75 at 'a'?

Rin: He'd tenuki and invade at 'b'. Because White's still got the aji of attaching at 'c', so his



group at the bottom is not dead yet.





Figure 3 (75-100)



Dia. 7

Yamabe: Black wouldn't like a white invasion at 'b'. I think that 75 is the only move.

Rin: If instead of 82 White had defended at the bottom with 1 in *Dia. 7*, I intended to force with 2 to 12. I wonder what's best after that.

Yamabe: Pushing down at 14 would make good thickness, wouldn't it? Black seems to be well ahead.

Murakami: The fact that 10 and 12 are sente is the reason why we get that tewari diagram (*Dia. 4*).

Rin: That's right. Moreover, ultimately White has to add one more reinforcing move.

Murakami: White 82 and 84 are quick-witted moves, I suppose.

Rin: I was grateful for them. When Black

connects at 91, White's shortage of liberties means that Black can do something on the inside.

Murakami: Really? If White now answers Black 99 with 'd', Black can play 'e'. That means that Black is left with the ko at 'f'.





Figure 4 (101-128)



Dia. 8

**Figure 4 (101-128). Needless timidity**

Rin: With 3 I should have cut at 22. The idea is not, of course, to capture the white group but to force it to seek life and in so doing simplify the game. But I was just a little worried about the black group on the left.

I never dreamed that White would attach at 28. My whole position now becomes rickety.

Yamabe: Is there anything to be frightened of when Black hanes at 1 in *Dia. 8* instead of 29?


Rin: No, there's not the slightest thing to be




frightened of. (laughter) White was perhaps thinking of the crosscut at 2 so that he could force with 4. That is to say, if White answers Black 'a' by capturing with 'b', Black can cut with 'c'; in this case, 2 and 4 help White to settle this group...

Yamabe: But what if Black captures with 3 in *Dia. 9*?

Rin: That's the point. Up to 7 this is not bad for Black. White is left with 'a', but I just give him the three stones.



*Dia. 9*



*Dia. 10*




Figure 4 (129-164)  
49: ko; 59: ko (at 41)

Figure 4 (129-164). Rin's lead upset

Yamabe: Was Black 29 funny?

Rin: Very. As a move, it's just a wild swing.

Yamabe: With 31, one feels tempted to des-

cend at 1 in *Dia. 10*...


Rin: After White 2 and Black 3, White crawls at 4; the group may not die, but Black loses territory.

Yamabe: White lived on a large scale up to 40.


Rin: I tricked myself. In byo-yomi I went haywire.

Murakami: Black 41 set out to capture the four surrounded stones on a large scale.

Yamabe: Black can capture them with good aji with 1 in *Dia. 11*, but his territory doesn't amount to much because White can play 2 and 4, then attach at 6.



*Dia. 11*



*Dia. 12*

Rin: Whatever happens, White wants to hane at 44.

Murakami: Is this the right timing for 45?

Yamabe: Instead of 53, if Black 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black captures the four white stones.

Rin: Next, White will force with 2 and 4, then secure the capture of the group at the top with 6 perhaps. I guess linking up with 9 and 11 next is big.

Yamabe: I suppose White 'a', Black 'b',



White 'c', Black 'd' will follow.

Rin: This is better than what happened in the game.

Murakami: When White played 54, Black couldn't omit 55, so the centre stones got away.

Rin: On top of that, I felt anxious about the centre group, so I felt compelled to play 61. But, still, this is a stupid kind of move; simply capturing at 63 would have been better.

Murakami: I suppose White had upset your lead.

Rin: Of course. The only thing is that it would have been bigger to finish capturing the black group with 64 at 'a'. That way White would have been a little ahead.

Murakami: A little, is it?





Figure 5 (165-203)

69: ko; 71: connects (at 66)



Dia. 13

Figure 5 (165-203). Do-or-die moves


Murakami: The ko fight begins in earnest with 65.

Yamabe: Black must win this ko fight.

Rin: If Black wins the ko, the white group at the top dies.

Yamabe: So White has no choice but to seek life with 70.

Rin: When Black connected the ko, the lead was up for grabs again.



Dia. 14

Murakami: Black 77 and 81 are time-saving moves?

Rin: They're terrible. Black 81, in particular, might have proved fatal.

Yamabe: Because if Black 81 hasn't been played, Black can play 1 in Dia. 13 as a ko threat ...

Murakami: If White ignores it, Black plays 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'. Black 1 is a threat that absolutely has to be answered.

Rin: I was fully aware of this when I played 81, but it was a time-saving move in byo-yomi, so it can't be helped.

Murakami: Black 101 was aiming at the cut at 'a'.

Rin: Whereupon White played the do-or-die move of 102. If instead White defends at 1 in Dia. 14, Black plays 2 and 4, and White must connect at 5. Black gets to play the reverse-yose move of 6. Connecting here is big! The endgame to 13 will follow; Black seems to be a little ahead. When I say ahead, it's a half-point game. It's a half-pointer that Black can't lose ... Of course, this is something we worked out when we were reviewing the game; at the time, I thought that it was a little unfavourable for Black.

Murakami: What if Black defends at 'b' with 103?

Rin: He loses.

Murakami: So that's why Black played 103, aiming at 'a' and 'c'. This was really touch-and-go.

Figure 6 (204-252). Black barely hangs on.

Rin: At this point we're fighting in the dark.

Murakami: Black's cut at 15 gave him the ko with 17 and 19.

Rin: However, not fighting a ko at all was best. I actually lost points by starting the ko fight.





*Rin and Nie go over the game with Kobayashi Koichi.*



That is, before living with 11, I should have peeped at 43, forcing White to connect at 45. At the time I thought that I would lose this way . . .





Figure 6 (204-252)

ko: 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44; 46: ko (at 6); 48: connects (at 5); 50: retakes (above 49); 51: left of 47



Dia. 15

Murakami: Up to 42, White fought on tenaciously with adjacent ko threats.

Yamabe: Cutting with 43 and 45 made it an absolute ko.

Rin: But Black loses points with the ko threats of 47 and 49. Actually I was hallucinating that capturing three stones with 49 would be sente, but it's not.

Yamabe: After White recaptures, you can't play Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' unless you have enough ko threats.

Rin: So instead of 47 playing the marked stone in Dia. 15 would have been better. White can't answer, so after he ends the ko, Black 1 to White 4 follow; this is sente for Black, so he could switch to 52 in the figure. This way I would have won by eight or nine points on the board.

Murakami: In the game White got to play 52.




Figure 7 (253-331)

ko: 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90: 92: captures (at 68); 100: ko (above 97); 129: ko (at 97); 130: connects (right of 98); 131: connects (above 97)

Figure 7 (253-331). More by luck than good judgement?

Rin: Instead of 63, I should have extended at 68, which would have wound up the game faster.

Yamabe: The endgame looks difficult.

Rin: It was just luck that I was able to win. I was pretty groggy, so I was like a boxer saved by the bell. If there had still been some important places to play, I might have been beaten.

Murakami: Well, it was an incredible game.

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

('Igo Club', September 1988)

## Semifinal 2: Takemiya v. Kobayashi

Compared to the long and complicated struggle between Rin and Nie, the game between Takemiya and Kobayashi was short and relatively straightforward. At least, on the surface it was easier for an amateur to work out what was going on and who was doing what to whom.

Takemiya hasn't done very well against Kobayashi Koichi in the past, so this game was a chance for him to take some revenge. The means he chose to do so was his favourite large-moyo strategy. Usually it's harder to set up a large moyo when you have white, but nothing stops Takemiya.

**White:** Takemiya Masaki Honinbo

**Black:** Kobayashi Koichi Kisei

Played in Osaka on 2 July 1988.

Commentary by Shiraishi Yutaka 9-dan.






Figure 1 (1-50)

**Figure 1 (1-50).** *Black takes all the territory.*

Up to 17 Kobayashi plays the same moves as he did in the second game of the Kisei title match (see the commentary in this issue), though White's moves are a little different. Note that Takemiya makes no effort to stop Kobayashi playing his favourite fuseki: he has full confidence in his own opening.

White 32 is the key move of the opening. Takemiya confessed that he didn't really know what was best here.

White 38. White is prepared for peace or for war. Playing at 'a' would have started an immediate fight; Black would have jumped in at 'b'.

Black 43. If at 'c', White plays 'd'; he can then aim at the placement at 'e'.

After 45, the position looks good for Black. Shiraishi: 'As a rule, they say, "You can't make territory out of an area open on both sides." The white territory extending from the left into the centre is open not just on two but on three sides. Takemiya is just about the only player on the contemporary go scene who would be happy with this kind of position. Either he's self-confident or he has a very relaxed approach. In any case, Black has taken everything that's on offer.' Shiraishi was not alone in this opinion. Hashimoto Utao 9-dan jokingly invited Ishii Shinzo 9-dan to play the game out from 45, with Hashimoto taking black.

**Figure 2 (51-100).** *Black's error in judgement*

Black 51 is too tight: he should jump in at 57. That would give Black an overwhelming lead in

territory.

White 56 aims at the ko with 62 to 68.






Figure 2 (51-100)

72, 75, 78: ko



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Black 71. If Black answers 70, he can't win the ko fight, as White gets another ko threat at 76. He should have finished off the ko with 71 at 'a'; Dia. 1 shows that White can't kill the top right corner. Black gets an even better result if White plays 1 in Dia. 2.

Black has no chance of winning after White 86, so he had to block at 1 in Dia. 3 with 85. The variation shown there, in which White can force with 'a' after 12, is good for White, but there are other variations. Shiraishi: 'Even though it's bad for Black, this would be nastier for White than what happened in the game. Black can try dif-




ferent moves along the way, so a confused fight would follow. That is what Black wants.'

When White secures his connection with 90, only the endgame is left. White has a big lead.




*Dia. 3*



*Figure 3 (101-145)*

*25, 28: ko*



*Figure 4 (146-187)*

*62, 65: ko; 87: connects (above 59)*

**Figure 3 (101-145), Figure 4 (146-187)**

After the game, Takemiya made an appearance in the hall in the same building (the Fujitsu Kansai Systems Laboratory building in Osaka) where a public commentary was given on the semifinals by Hashimoto Utaro and Ishii Kunio.

Ishii: Have you reached a conclusion?

Takemiya: We can't come to a conclusion, so I've left early. Kobayashi's going over the game by himself.

Hashimoto: Takemiya, you've got stronger, haven't you?

Takemiya: True. Even I can't help wondering where such a strong player's been hiding until now.

Ishii: Most professionals are modest, but you're a different type.

Takemiya: No, I'm just honest.

Takemiya's sallies were all greeted with laughter by the audience. His personality is so bright and cheerful that his frequent boasting (which is always quite sincere) never makes a bad impression. That's an enviable attribute.

One high-ranking player had the following comment on his centre strategy: 'It's possible that Takemiya has a feel for and an understanding of the four or five lines around the centre point different in nature from those of any previous professional.' *White wins by 8 1/2 points.*

## Round 1: Kato v. Imamura

To go back a bit, here is one of the most exciting games from the first round. Imamura Toshiya 8-dan (born on 29 March 1966) is the Kansai Ki-in's rival to Yoda at the Nihon Ki-in. He hasn't had quite as much success as Yoda yet, but he demonstrates the potential to develop into a top player. The hard time he gives Kato in the game below is evidence of that.

The Kansai Ki-in chose its representatives in the Fujitsu Cup in the same way as the Nihon Ki-in, that is, they gave the places to the top prize-money winners of the previous year. Actually, that meant that originally Sato Sunao, who boosted his earnings a lot last year by playing in the Honinbo league, was the second Kansai Ki-in player, but when he withdrew because of bad health his place was taken by Imamura.

**White:** Kato Masao Meijin (Nihon Ki-in)


**Black:** Imamura Toshiya 8-dan (Kansai Ki-in)

Played on 2 April 1988 at the Nihon Ki-in.






*Imamura Toshiya*



*Figure 1 (1-67)*




*Dia. 1*

**Figure 1 (1-67). Imamura's bold play**

Imamura played with all the boldness of youth. When he set up a gigantic moyo with 19 and 21, Kato had to invade. The key move in deciding the course of the game was Black 45. Black could have secured the bottom area with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, but Imamura preferred to continue his attack on the white group above.

When White lived at the bottom, Black sought compensation by attacking in the centre. Black 67 was a move overflowing with aggression.

The fight it started continued for most of the game.



*Figure 2 (67-105)*

**Figure 2 (67-105). An inevitable fight**

Kato is not the kind of player to run away from a fight. He counterattacked vigorously, leading to a hectic struggle in the centre.

Black 91 is a good move. The white cut at 'a' looks dangerous, but Black has the clever counter of 'b'.

White moves to the second stage of his counterattack with 92. The continuation is natural. With 104, the scene is set for a semeai (capturing race). If White cuts at 'c', followed by Black 'd' through White 'g', then this black group only has five liberties. That means that Black can't let the white group below (92 etc.) get more than five liberties.

Imamura attacked at 105, but when he played this move he actually expected to be crushed.



*Kato has to put in some hard work when he misses the opportunity presented by Black 105.*







Figure 3 (106-155)

25, 28: ko; 31: takes two stones; 32: retakes



Dia. 2

### Figure 3 (106-155). Kato's oversight

White 6 was a mistake. Kato missed an easy chance to win the game by following *Dia. 2*. Instead, a ko followed after White 22. White captured 11 black stones, but the thickness Black built kept him in the game.

Black 49 is another aggressive move.

### Figure 4 (156-202). A fatal slip

White 66. White can't resist with 1 in *Dia. 3*: Black gets a ko up to 8. Black reaps quite a harvest in this fight up to 69.

White 70. The fact that White doesn't simply play 86 shows that he's worried.

After 83, the white group was dead, so Kato played a probe with 84. Black's answer at 85 lost the game. It would have been a very close contest if Black had followed *Dia. 4*. He sacrifices his centre stones, but in return breaks into the corner. Black 1 and 3 ensure that the white group in the top right corner remains dead.






Figure 4 (156-202)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Kato seized his chance and in a flash the game was settled.

*Black resigns after White 202.*

## Round 1: Ma v. Jang

To conclude our coverage in this issue, here is a brief commentary on another first-round game. Jang Doo-Jin was the number three player for Korea in the tournament. The first two, Cho Hun-hyun and Suh Bong-soo, were chosen automatically, as they top the prize-money lists year in year out. Jang won a special tournament held to select the third representative; born on 4 March 1953, he is 35, the same age as Cho (born on 10 March) and Suh (the oldest, born on 1



February). The game is not a very exciting one, as Ma took an early lead, then immediately started the endgame, but it is worthy of note as the first official encounter between a South Korean and a Chinese player. As our readers may remember, there was an unofficial match played between Cho Hun-hyun and Nie Weiping in California in early 1985 (the result was 1-1; see GW41).




*Jang 6-dan*

**White:** Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China)

**Black:** Jang Doo-Jin 6-dan

Played on 2 April 1988 at the Nihon Ki-in.

*Commentary by Rin Kaiho.*




*Figure 1 (1-60)*

**Figure 1 (1-60).** *Ma runs away with the race.*

Ma was satisfied with the result to 32 in the bottom right corner. White 30 nips in the bud the influence of Black's wall. That means that Black

19 was probably dubious.

White 38 is evidence of Ma's shrewd positional judgement. If Black answers with 39 on the left side, White will peep at 'a', then extend along the top. Still, instead of 39, Black should perhaps counterattack on a large scale with 'b'. Defending underneath with moves like 43 and 45 is just what White wants.



*Figure 2 (61-118)*

**Figure 2 (61-118).** *Winning without fighting*

This must have been a frustrating game for Jang. It's not that he was outfought — Ma didn't even let him get close enough to fight.

*Moves 119 to 235 omitted. White wins by 10 1/2 points.*

(Commentaries taken from the Yomiuri newspaper, except for the Rin-Nie game. Translated by John Power.)



*Ma 9-dan*



# 1st IBM Haya-go Open Tournament

As reported in our previous issue, three players from the Nihon Ki-in and one from the Kansai Ki-in have reached the IBM semifinals, which are scheduled for 4 October. Overseas players have not had as much success as in the other two international tournaments founded this year, but of the 64 players who started out in the first round, only four were visitors: Chen Xinlin and Yang Hui of China and Suh 8-dan and Li 2-dan of Korea. Of course, they were joined by a number of Korean and Taiwanese players who are members of the Nihon Ki-in.

The best performance by an overseas player was that by Suh, who reached the quarter-finals. In this issue, we would like to present his game against Ishida Yoshio, together with a win by the Taiwanese player O Rissei.

## Quarter-final 1: Ishida v. Suh

Suh 8-dan is not to be confused with Suh Bong-soo 9-dan, the number two Korean professional who played in the Fujitsu cup. Suh, born on 5 May 1958, was making his first appearance in an international tournament. After defeating a Nihon Ki-in 5-dan and two 7-dans, he ran into Ishida Yoshio, who has gained a lot of international 'experience' this year by being the main commentator at public commentaries on the Fujitsu Cup games. Despite that, Ishida was almost eliminated in the third round, played on the morning of the 21st, when he had a very hard fight against Shuko; it was only his greater tenacity in the endgame that enabled him to come out half a point ahead. Ishida approached the game with Suh warily, because at lunchtime he had played through Suh's third-round win over Kanda 7-dan and found him to be an extremely aggressive player.

**White:** Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

**Black:** Suh 8-dan

Played on 21 July 1988 at the Nihon Ki-in.

*Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.*

### Figure 1 (1-50). *Ishida's good start*

Black 31. Black usually continues with 'a' after forcing with 27 and 29.

Black 33 and 35 show how aggressive Suh is. He disregards the territorial loss here, as he is

aiming at attacking the white group on the right.

Black 37 and 39 are sente, but 41 gives White the chance to counterattack at 42. Black can't find a good answer to that move, so he dodges to 43, but the continuation is good for White. If Black were to play 43 at 1 in *Dia. 1*, White would crosscut at 2 and get a nice territory on the right side.





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1





The famous 'Kitani trio', who made their names as prodigies in the 1960's, are having mixed success in international tournaments: Kato has to be content with looking forward to next year, Takemiya has won the Fujitsu Cup, and Ishida has a chance in the IBM tournament.





Figure 2 (51-100)  
ko: 90, 95, 100

**Figure 2 (51-100).** *Suh goes on the attack.*

White 60. An unnecessary reinforcement, according to Ishida Yoshio, who regretted not making a hane at 62 instead.

With 61, a move which took Ishida by surprise, Suh started a fight in a very cramped area, but when White played 64 he didn't continue in the same aggressive vein by using 65 to cut at 66.



Dia. 2

Black 69 must be at 70. If White cuts at 2 in Dia. 2, Black 3 and 5 give him a far superior position to that in the game. Of course, Suh was aiming at setting up a double attack with 71 to 75.

Neither side gives an inch in the fight that follows.

**Figure 3 (101-140).** *Ishida's risky decision*

White 2. Ishida Yoshio: 'If you compare the white groups on the right and on the left, the one on the left is weaker. Adding a stone to the stronger group with 2 was illogical. I should have defended the group on the right by capturing the



ko at 3. If Black then captured the ko on the left with Black 15, the white group wouldn't die because it can push up at 28. When Black connected at 3, I thought for a moment that I was a goner.'




Figure 3 (101-140)  
22, 25: ko

With Black 7 Suh wasted his chance. What would have happened if he had launched a grand offensive with Black 8, White 'a', Black 9? White would jump out at the top to 'b', but would he be able to get two eyes there or would he be annihilated? It would be a very close thing either way.

Ishida Akira: 'White 8 is the vital point. When White plays here, Black can't eliminate all his weak points with one move. The game is decided when White cuts at 10.'

Black does get a ko after 19 and 21, but playing 26 and 28 is good enough for White. He takes a big lead when he reduces Black's top area with 32, then further gouges it out with 58 in Figure 4.

Figure 4 (141-166). *Well ahead*

Black 65. If at 66, Black has no answer to White 'a', Black 65, White 'b'.

Moves after 166 omitted. Black resigns.

## Quarter-final 2: O v. Ogata

This was one of the most exciting games from the tournament. From beginning to end, it's one furious fight; some professionals commented that it's a haya-go masterpiece.

O Rissei is the leading Taiwanese professional after Rin playing in Japan. To reach the




Figure 4 (141-166)  
44: connects; 54: connects (above 50)

quarter-finals, he had to subdue two of the top players of the Yoda generation: Komatsu Hideki (born in 1967) and Ogata Masaki (born in 1964), both of whom have recently won the *Kido* 'New Face' prize.

White: O Rissei 8-dan

Black: Ogata Masaki 7-dan

Played on 21 July 1988 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Ishida Akira.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *The right to squeeze*

The action starts with Black 25. Black could capture White 24 by playing at 30, but Ogata refuses to give White the forcing moves on the

outside. Instead, he sacrifices five stones so that he's the one who squeezes.

When Black tries to squeeze in the corner as well with 45, White rebels.




Figure 2 (51-100)

**Figure 2 (51-100). Attacking the black wall**

Black 57 is overdoing things: better to jump peacefully to 74. White ignores 57 and sets out to attack Black's wall with 58.

O Rissei again shows his strength with the shoulder hit of 64. The aim of this move is to turn 57 into a wasted move. When White cuts at 76 and steals Black's eyes up to 84, the large black group does appear to be in serious danger.




Figure 3 (101-150)

ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 22, 25, 30, 33, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50  
**Figure 3 (101-150), Figure 4 (151-200). The ko fight spreads.**

The ko fight is long and complicated, as both

sides have plenty of ko threats.




Figure 4 (151-200)

ko: 58, 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99




Figure 5 (201-238)

ko (around 10): 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34

**Figure 5 (201-238). An unfavourable exchange**

Black 1, 3. White 100 in Figure 4 showed that O was prepared to cede the ko in return for a chance to attack the centre black group. Black can't let him do that, but another ko erupts here. The white stones in the top left corner are not sufficient compensation, as the black group in the bottom left corner can't make eyes.

Moves after 238 omitted. Black resigns.

('Go Weekly', 16 August 1988. Translated by John Power.)



# Fighting for \$400,000: The Ing Cup

## The 1st Ing Cup: The World Professional Go Championship

The richest go tournament ever, the Ing Cup, got off to a spectacular start in Beijing on 21 and 23 August. This tournament is making history in a number of ways. First and foremost, the prize money for 1st place of \$400,000 is the biggest ever offered for a go tournament. (The next highest is the total of \$280,000 that Kobayashi Koichi won when he defended the Kisei title earlier this year.) Second, it is the first professional tournament in which players from China and Taiwan have competed together; the Taiwanese and Korean players who visited Beijing for the opening rounds were also the first competitors from their countries in any sport to be invited to China. Third, and this is actually the most extraordinary feature of the tournament, the entire prize money was, in effect, donated by one man, the Taiwanese industrialist Ing Chang-Ki, after whom the tournament is named. Ing easily qualifies as the greatest benefactor the game has ever had: he single-handedly established a professional system in Taiwan, he founded the World Youth Go Championship, and now with the Ing Cup he has made his greatest contribution to the internationalization of the game.



*Ing Chang-Ki giving an address at the Opening Ceremony*

### Tournament conditions

*1st prize: \$400,000*

*2nd prize: \$100,000*

*3rd prizes: \$25,000 x 2*

*5th prizes: \$15,000 x 4*

*9th prizes: \$5,000 x 8*

*Komi: 7 1/2; time: 3 hours each*

*Semifinals: best-of-three matches*

*Final: best-of-five match*

*Honorary Tournament Chairman: Go Seigen*

*The Ing Cup is scheduled to be played every four years, in the year of the Olympics.*

### Round 1 (21 August)

*Rin Kaiho (Taiwan) (B) beat Hashimoto Shoji (Kansai Ki-in) by 1 1/2 points.*

*Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan (China) (W) beat Takemiya Masaki Honinbo (Japan) by 7 1/2 points.*

*Kobayashi Koichi Kisei (Japan) (B) beat O Rissei 8-dan (Taiwan) by 2 1/2 points.*

*Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea) (B) beat O Meien 8-dan (Taiwan) by resignation.*

*Kato Masao Meijin (Japan) (W) beat Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan (China) by resignation.*

*Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan (Japan) (B) beat Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China) by resignation.*

*Nie Weiping 9-dan (China) (B) beat Michael Redmond (USA) by resignation.*

*Cho Chikun Judan (Korea) (W) beat Wu Songsheng 9-dan (Australia) by 1 1/2 points.*

### Round 2 (23 August)

*Rin beat Jiang, Cho Hun-hyun beat Kobayashi, Fujisawa beat Kato, Nie beat Cho Chikun.*

*The semifinals (best-of-three matches) will be played in Taiwan in November. The final will be a best-of-five. Pairings for the semifinals are Shuko v. Nie and Rin v. Cho Hun-hyun.*

Another feature of the tournament that attracted a lot of comment was the komi of 7 1/2 points given by Black. This is the first time that such a large komi has been used in an international tournament; it is the standard komi in professional go in Taiwan, but most of the Japanese professionals thought it was too big. However, one of Ing's aims in holding the tournament was to popularize this komi international-



*The Ing Cup gets under way.*

ly. The rules used were also the Taiwanese rules, devised by Ing; the main feature is that both territory and occupied intersections are counted. Incidentally, a modified nigiri system was used in which the player who won the nigiri chose which colour he wanted (usually he automatically takes black); it's interesting to note that only two players out of eight (Takemiya and Liu) chose black.

The 16-man tournament got off to an exciting start with some great players coming to grief in the first two rounds played in Beijing but with an ideal line-up for the semifinals of one representative from each of the four go superpowers. They are Nie Weiping of China, Rin Kaiho of Taiwan, Cho Hun-hyun of Korea, and Fujisawa Shuko of Japan. The success of the first three players named above came as no surprise, but, although he was the sentimental favourite of many, there can have been few fans who expected Fujisawa Shuko to turn in such a great performance. The reason is not ability, for as any professional will tell you, especially Shuko himself, he may be the greatest player of them all. Rather, the reason is that in recent years Shuko has been handicapped by bad health; in 1983 he had a massive stomach operation, then last year

he suffered from two bouts of lymph cancer, which necessitated debilitating chemotherapy. Even now, his state of health still seems to be fragile, but, operating on sheer will power, he has made a brilliant comeback, playing a decisive role in this year's Meijin league and now defeating two top players in the Ing Cup. The only worrying point is whether his stamina will be up to the best-of-three semifinal with Nie Weiping; after the first round, he was so exhausted that he was unable to attend the drawing for the second round. However, he is undoubtedly looking forward to this opportunity of showing the younger players who is really number one. Victory in this tournament would certainly be a marvellous way to cap a great career.

There were many other notable games in the first two rounds. One was the first-ever tournament game between American and Chinese professionals; unfortunately, Michael Redmond found the going too tough against Nie Weiping. Another interesting pairing was between Cho Chikun and the number two Chinese player from the early 1970's, Wu Songsheng 9-dan, who emigrated to Australia three years ago. Despite his lack of match practice in recent years, Wu gave Cho a close run for his money; their game



was the only one which would have had a different result with the usual komi. In the second round, Cho Hun-hyun got his revenge for his painful first-round loss to Kobayashi in the Fujitsu Cup; playing for his homeland of Korea for the first time, Cho Chikun suffered his first loss ever in an international match. At the farewell party after the round, Cho broke down in tears and was consoled by teammate Cho Hun-hyun. It's a long time since Cho has cried over a loss — he must have been taking this tournament very seriously.

Only last year, the Taiwanese representative in the World Amateur Go Championship held in Beijing declined to make an appearance; this year a Taiwanese-sponsored tournament is not only held in Beijing but is the object of massive coverage by the Chinese media. It seems very likely that the tournament is the harbinger of a further thaw in relations between the two Chinas; the acid test will come in November, when it will be the turn of the Taiwanese government to welcome Nie Weiping. Everyone connected with the tournament received lavish hospitality from their Chinese hosts, but the biggest surprise for the visitors was that at the Opening Party the player who received the most enthusiastic applause was not the Chinese national hero Nie Weiping but the Taiwanese representative Rin Kaiho. Even Rin seemed to be taken aback by how popular he was. He was after all born in Shanghai, so perhaps the mainlanders feel that he is one of their own; his victory over Nie in the Fujitsu Cup couldn't have hurt his standing with Chinese fans.

### The problem of the komi

Before the tournament started, the problem of the komi had to be thrashed out. No one objected to the size of the prizes, a lot of people did to the size of the komi. All the participants attended a meeting held on the evening of the 19th, the aim of which was in theory to decide the komi. It was the understanding of the Japanese side that the komi was still to be decided, but they found that the 7 1/2-point komi was pretty much a fait accompli (for one thing, it was already mentioned in the tournament program). The press was shut out from this meeting, but *Kido* learned that players such as Kato, Kobayashi, Shuko and Cho Chikun expressed objections; however, they were neatly parried when Chen Zude 9-dan, the President of the China


Weiqi Association and Vice Chairman of the Tournament, expressed his desire that Ing's komi be adopted. Obviously Ing had laid the groundwork well; with the Chinese hosts supporting him, opposition was fruitless. Of course, considering his generosity in creating the tournament, it would be strange if he couldn't organize it the way he wanted to.

### Highlights from the first round

As mentioned above, the player who won the nigiri had the right to choose white or black. In the first round six of the eight players who won the nigiri chose to take white. Takemiya and Liu Xiaoguang, both of whom prefer playing with black whatever the komi, were the exceptions. Kudo Norio 9-dan, who was the assistant referee (the chief referee was Ing), commented that he could only detect one game in which White was purposely adopting a restrained strategy, relying on the large komi, but he did notice that in most games Black was making special efforts to play positively. Kobayashi Koichi, for example, played the Chinese-style fuseki for the first time in about five years. Incidentally, the Chinese prepared for this tournament by playing practice games with a 7 1/2-point komi.

### Kobayashi Koichi v. O Rissei

This was the only encounter between fellow Nihon Ki-in players in the first round. O Rissei, of course, was playing for Taiwan, where he is known as Wang Li-ch'eng.




*Kobayashi Koichi (black) v. O Rissei*

Black 5 at 'a', followed by Black 'b', is the so-called 'Kobayashi style'. Recently he has been experimenting with Black 5 at 19, the 'new Kobayashi style' (see the second Kisei game in this issue); his playing the Chinese style shows that, in his words, 'I was very conscious of the 7 1/2 komi.' The aggressive pincer of 7 was probably played for the same reason.

### Redmond v. Nie

In the first round, Michael Redmond became the second Westerner to challenge Nie Weiping this year (Schlemper's game in the Fujitsu Cup is given in GW52). Michael was one of the six players who chose to take white, though not without some hesitation in his case.




Michael Redmond (white) v. Nie

20: ko; 22: connects


Ignoring White 18 is a Nie innovation in this pattern. Black 19 at 'a' has been played in Japan, but switching to 19, refusing to commit himself, is more logical. Capturing the ko with 20 is natural, but connecting at 22 is premature. Instead, White should atari at 'b', followed by Black 3, White 'c'. The result in the game is painful for White, because Black is left with the option of playing 29.

### Cho Chikun v. Wu Songsheng

This is the game Kudo was referring to when he said that there was only one game in which White played patiently. White seems to be influenced by the komi when he turns at 34 and when he cedes the good point of 45 to Black. Cho only won by 1 1/2 points, so he would have lost with the usual komi.



Cho Chikun (white) v. Wu



Takemiya (black) v. Jiang

Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)



### Jiang Zhujiu v. Takemiya

Takemiya's decision to take black regardless of the large komi perhaps indicates the degree of his confidence in the sanren-sei. In fact, the game started out very well for him and it looked like a comfortable win, but a terrible pitfall was waiting for him. The attack at 47 in Figure 3 was a mistake that cost him the game. He hadn't realized that White could counter on the outside at 48 and capture him. This lost him about ten points. The game continued to move 335 and was a jigo on the board.

*Moves after 156 omitted. White wins by 7 1/2 points.*




Figure 3 (101-156)

### Kato v. Liu

Liu chose to take black against Kato because he bases his game on seizing the initiative in the early fighting, so the size of the komi becomes a secondary consideration. Against Kato, however, he tried too hard and fell prey to a severe counterattack.

#### Figure 1 (1-50)

Black 35 is an overextension: Black 45 is usual.

Liu commented that 37 should have been at 50 and that instead of 39 he should have simply jumped to 44.

#### Figure 2 (51-100)

Kato takes control of the game, harrying and harassing Black's weak groups. In particular, his fearless move at 80 aroused admiration (cutting to the right of 74 would let Black squeeze). A

Chinese fan commented: 'You realize why Kato's called "the killer".'




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)


#### Figure 3 (101-144) (next page)

Skilful play by Black enables him to survive the attack, but White has taken a big lead. White 44 is the coup de grace.

*Black resigns after White 144.*

### Fujisawa Shuko v. Ma


The highlight of the first round for Shuko fans was his crushing defeat of Ma. It was Shuko who 'discovered' Ma on a tour of China seven years ago and who first warned his fellow Japanese of this new prodigy about to emerge in China, but here he shows the youngster that he still has a trick or two to teach him.



*Kato v. Liu: Figure 3 (101-144)*

*Figure 1 (1-50)*

Shuko plays his favourite thick style with moves like 17 and 23; he continues in the same vein with 45 and 47.



*Ma (White) v. Shuko: Figure 1 (1-50)*  
43: connects

*Figure 2 (51-100)*

Black 51 is magnificent — the kind of move Shuko used to play in his heyday. At one stroke it decides the game. For Ma it must have been quite a shock; Shuko's Kisei opponents of the past will sympathize with him.


After setting up his win with 51 to 65, Shuko winds up the game in masterly fashion. His timing is very instructive.

*Figure 3 (101-163)*


After he went on to beat Kato in the second

round, Shuko received compliments about his strength from quite a few people. He was not flattered. For him the results were no more than he had expected, and the tournament was simply proceeding according to schedule. He did, however, mention in an interview that Hashimoto Utaro, in Beijing to observe the tournament, told him the morning after the second round that he had correctly predicted the semifinalists.

*White resigns after Black 163.*



*Figure 2 (51-100)*



*Figure 3 (101-163)*

## Round 2: Cho Chikun v. Nie Weiping

These two players first met during the 1984 Chinese team tour of Japan. Cho took their best-of-three match with two straight wins (see GW37). At the draw for the first round Nie com-




mented: 'At that time I was no match for Cho. This is my chance to take revenge.'

**White:** Cho Chikun


**Black:** Nie Weiping

Played on 23 August 1988 in Beijing.


*Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.*



*Figure 1 (1-34)*



*Dia. 1*



*Dia. 2*

**Figure 1 (1-34).** Two moves cause Cho to fall behind in the opening.


The game gets off to a quiet start, with the two players peacefully marking off their territory on the board. The enclosure of 17 is an inimitable Nie move.

Shuko: 'White falls behind in two areas. First, with 16 he should play the kosumi at 20 and aim


at invading at A.

'I don't like White 24 in response to the invasion at 23. The shape on the right side has already been settled, so surely jumping like this has little effect. I think White should jump to the corner of the white stone at 1 in *Dia. 1*, applying pressure to the left side while attacking the stone to the right.

'Black 25 is a very impressive move. If White descends at 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will jump to 2; if then White 3, Black has a very good answer at 4. However, White 26 in the figure is also painful; up to 33 Black's manoeuvres have all succeeded.'



*Figure 2 (35-65)*



*Dia. 3*

**Figure 2 (35-65).** A concept unknown to Japanese professionals

Black 35. Jumping to 46 would also be a good move.

Cho: 'When I reduced Black's side area with 36 to 46, I thought that because of the large komi

I had a reasonable game. But if you take a proper look, you realize it was very bad for White. Black has linked up on the side and White has taken gote. With 40 I should have pushed up at 1 in *Dia. 3*. The fact that Black does not link up there seems to make *Dia. 3* better.

Black plays forcing moves on the edge with 47 and 49, then 51. Look at how fast he runs away with the game!

Shuko: "This is magnificent. This way of thinking is unknown to the top Japanese players. It's something we have to learn from Nie."

Shuko had no further comments on the game. To his eyes, it was already over. If you consider the amount of secure territory Black has on the right after 53, it's certainly clear that White is in trouble. That's why he makes a desperate invasion with 56, but here too Nie counters with flawless precision.




Figure 3 (66-100)



Nie Weiping




Figure 4 (101-140)




Figure 5 (141-173)

### Figures 3, 4, 5

Nie is strong. Cho tries everything he can think of; at times Nie fends him off solidly, at other times he counterattacks strongly. There is no chink in his armour. He may have been out-classed in his encounter with Cho four years ago, but he's not the same player. After his loss in the Fujitsu Cup, Kobayashi Koichi recognized that Nie had got stronger; Cho now has reason to agree with him.

*White resigns after Black 173.*

### Fujisawa Shuko v. Kato

Shuko apparently agrees that the large komi is good for White. He won the nigiri but declined to play Black. However, he maintained that he



didn't change his strategy because of the komi.

**White:** Fujisawa Shuko

**Black:** Kato Masao

Played on 23 August 1988 in Beijing.

*Commentary by Shuko.*






Figure 1 (1-50)  
24: connects



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

**Figure 1 (1-50). Giving up the 'key' stones**

Shuko: 'I still don't really understand 36. The diagonal connection of 1 in *Dia. 1* makes better eye shape, but now Black won't extend at 3. Black 2 to White 9 would follow; I guess this would be a reasonable game.'

Shuko adopts a resolute strategy with 44. 'Losing the two stones I've just played is a little painful, but I can take the key point of 'a' and

getting stones at 46 and 48 means that I can play strongly with 50. At this stage I thought that the game was a close contest.'

If instead of 44 White pulls out his two stones with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will continue his attack with 2, and White will have trouble settling his groups. White attempts to turn the game in his favour by giving up the two stones.






Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

**Figure 2 (51-100). Another sacrifice**

Shuko later played an even more surprising sacrifice. He lived in the corner, then after Black struck at the vital point with 63 he played a whole string of stones from 74 that were destined to be captured with Black 91. All White got out of it was the forcing moves of 90 and 92. The players following the game thought that this was terrible and conjectured that Shuko had made an oversight in his analysis.

Shuko: 'No. This was all according to plan. Even though I sacrificed the stones, I didn't lose that much. When I switched to 100, I thought it was a reasonable game.'

When Shuko says this, then each move begins

to seem natural, but the truth of the matter is that there was some very subtle give-and-take involved. First, White 82 is a good move. If Black carelessly blocks at 1 in *Dia. 3*, he can't win the semeai (capturing race) after White 2 to 6. Even if he hanes at 7, he has to lose something after White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

Playing White 88 at 1 in *Dia. 4* looks good, but Black gives way at 2 and now White is behind in the capturing race. Even if White cuts at 5 or 'a', Black has a good counter at 6.

Assessment of the overall position after 100 is difficult. Most of the professionals following the game thought, with Kato, that Black was ahead. However, there was a gradual shift to majority support of White.

Shuko: 'I was asked whether I would have played the same way with a 5 1/2-point komi, and the answer is yes. All you can do is to play your best move by move. I'm not dexterous enough to change the way I play so easily.'




Figure 3 (101-150)

#### Figure 3 (101-150). The losing move

Shuko plays faultlessly, securing a quick life up to 14, then countering Black's attack at the bottom with the 28-30 combination. Shuko: 'Black 45 is the losing move, I think. If he had extended at 46, it would still have been a very difficult game.' White 46 is big because it serves to attack the black group to the left.

#### Figure 4 (151-204). Still fighting fit

The continuation to 67 in Figure 4 decides the game.




Figure 4 (151-204)  
55: connects (left of 53)

In the Ing Cup Shuko showed that he is still a force to be reckoned with. Fortunately, he has plenty of time to prepare for the semifinal in November.

Moves after 204 omitted. White wins by 5 1/2 points.

\*\*\*\*\*

Of the 12 games played so far in this tournament, seven have been won by Black, a winning percentage (56.3%) actually higher than that usual in professional play in Japan, which is between 53% and 54%. Of course, one tournament is obviously not enough of a test, but it will be interesting to see if the Ing komi wins any adherents outside Taiwan.

In his address at the Farewell Party, Ing said: 'There was resistance to the point-counting system [his name for the Ing counting system and komi], but the result was a great success and I am satisfied. Heaven has also come to my assistance by producing semifinalists from the four different areas of Japan, Korea, the continent, and Taiwan. I've been so excited each day that I haven't been able to sleep at night . . . I'm happy that this tournament has played a major role in spreading go around the world. Thank you.'


(Adapted from a report by Akiyama Kenji in the October 1988 'Kido' by John Power.)



# 36 Tesuji Patterns


*Sakata Eio, Hon. Honinbo*

*In this series Sakata Eio reviews 36 basic tesuji patterns. Mastery of these standard tesujis will add power to your game.*




*Pattern 7: Black to play*

How can Black link up his two isolated stones on the left to his corner group?



*Pattern 8: Black to play*

Black can't kill the corner group, so he has to find a tesuji to link up to the stones on the left.



*Pattern 9: Black to play*

Black would like to link up his bottom group to the two stones above on the right side, but that is not so easy. This is a famous tesuji.

*Answers on page 59.*

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
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## 12th Kisei Title



*This year's Kisei match found Kobayashi Koichi in his best form for years . . .*

By winning the Kisei title for the third year in a row, Kobayashi has proved that he is no mere flash in the pan. Of course, there was never a suspicion of that, but when Kato Masao took the Meijin title from him after just one year, it did seem possible that his reign at the top would be short-lived and that the one to dethrone him would be Kato.

Two years ago, Kobayashi was on top of the world, with the Kisei, Meijin, Judan, and Tengen titles, giving him four of the top five titles. It was not long, however, before Kato began pushing him off centre stage, as he took first the Meijin title (1986), then the Judan title (1987) from him. When Kato became the challenger for this year's Kisei title, most fans thought that Kobayashi's days as Kisei were numbered. Every year the Yomiuri takes a poll of its readers, asking them to predict the result of the title match; this year 64% picked Kato as the winner.

If Kobayashi had surrendered the Kisei title as easily as the 1986 Meijin title, which he lost 0-4, the lustre of his reputation would have been considerably dimmed. He has already come in for a certain amount of criticism from fellow professionals for his pragmatic approach to strategy, in particular, his policy of reducing the complexity of the game and simplifying wherever possible.

Kobayashi came up with the answer to the doubters with his brilliant play in this Kisei title match. He put aside his fondness for territory and based his strategy on attack. His aggression paid off. Kobayashi probably gets more satisfaction out of beating Kato than any other player; thanks to his victory, he has secured his place in the front rank of contemporary go players. With three Kisei titles, he has also drawn level with Cho Chikun; now he can take up a real challenge: matching Shuko's record of six straight.

We presented the first game of the series in GW52; here are the remaining four games, two of them with Kobayashi's own commentary.

### Kisei Title Winners

- 1 (1977): Fujisawa Shuko defeated Hashimoto Uтарo 4-1.
- 2 (1978): Shuko d. Kato Masao 4-3.
- 3 (1979): Shuko d. Ishida Yoshio 4-1.
- 4 (1980): Shuko d. Rin Kaiho 4-1.
- 5 (1981): Shuko d. Otake Hideo 4-0.
- 6 (1982): Shuko d. Rin Kaiho 4-3.
- 7 (1983): Cho Chikun d. Shuko 4-3.
- 8 (1984): Cho d. Rin 4-2.
- 9 (1985): Cho d. Takemiya Masaki 4-3.
- 10 (1986): Kobayashi Koichi d. Cho 4-2.
- 11 (1987): Kobayashi d. Takemiya 4-1.
- 12 (1988): Kobayashi d. Kato 4-1.



*Whereas Kato seems to have lost his magic touch.*



## Game Two


**White:** Kato Masao Meijin

**Black:** Kobayashi Koichi Kisei

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 9 hours each.

Played in Kaga City, Ishikawa prefecture on 27, 28 January 1988.

*Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan.*



*Figure 1 (1-29)*

### Figure 1 (1-29). The new Kobayashi style


This game follows the same pattern as the first, with Kobayashi building thickness and attacking. The pattern from 1 to 5 has been around for a long time, but recently it seems to be Kobayashi's particular favourite. Perhaps you could call it the New Kobayashi Style. Its special feature is that it works in concert with the joseki in the bottom left corner to assert Black's territorial superiority.

White 14. If the knight's move at 'a', Black 'b' feels right; when White plays 14, Black naturally wants to play 15. With 16 —

*Dia. 1.* If White makes a pincer around 1, Black will probably be happy to invade the corner. After 10, 'a' and 'b' are miai for Black, so this result is bad for White. When the marked stone is at 'c', Black 'b' is not very severe, so White has time to defend at 'd'.


Black 17 is a carefully considered move. The moves to 16 were the same as in a Meijin league game a week earlier between Kobayashi (black) and Cho. However, with 17 Kobayashi had played at 'c' against Cho. There are a couple of possible reasons for the change. With his solid position in this game, Black proclaims that he is not afraid of the white moyo. He declines to

make the Black 'd'–White 'e' exchange because he is aiming at invading at 'f'. For his part, White is reluctant to attach at 'g', provoking Black 'h' and making Black 17 over-concentrated (from a two-stone wall 17 should be a three-space extension), because Black 'h' would make the white moyo thin. I think that Black 17 is a move worth playing further.



*Dia. 1*

*Dia. 2*



*Dia. 3*

The large points of 18 and 19 are miai. The wideness of the gap between 1 and 17 is the reason why White feels inclined to give priority to the extension to 18. Instead of 19 —

*Dia. 2.* Answering at 1 would be just a little slack. White would force once with 2, then switch to 4. This way he plays both of the supposed miai points.

When White pressed at 20, following the standard pattern, I was very impressed with Black 21. Kobayashi Kisei probably played this move full of confidence. It threatens to attach at 'i' and urges White to take some action.

White 22. For better or for worse, White has no choice but to attach here. The sequence from Black 23 looks reasonable, but I have never seen this shape before. Extending at 29 makes Black thick; already he seems to be ahead. Instead of 24 —

*Dia. 3.* If White cuts at 1, the ladder doesn't work, so he has to extend at 3; after Black 4 and 6, White is faced with a tough fight. There is the resolute attack of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', but White's shape has so many holes in it that this is not feasible.

My opinion is that Kobayashi scored a strategic victory in the opening fight.




Figure 2 (30-73)

**Figure 2 (30-73).** *Black gets thicker and thicker.*

White 30. White can't afford to delay in reducing Black's moyo, but Black's wall works effectively; Black just gets thicker and thicker as the game progresses, while White finds it far from easy to make shape.

Black's capping move at 33 works perfectly, so the theory was advanced that White should have played 32 at 'a'. However, Black would attack at the vital point of 40 and White would be unlikely to get a better result than in the game.


Black 41. Black could also attack at 44, but White 41 would stabilize the group. Black chooses to drive White out into the centre; in the process he surrounds the top with 43 and 45.

Black 51. Black has been aiming at this invasion for some time. The game is following Kobayashi's favourite pattern. His reaction to each new position is to narrow the focus and simplify the game.

White 60 and 62 may be premature. I had trouble working out what was White's losing move in this game, but I think these moves can be counted as a factor in his loss.

*Dia. 4.* I think that White had no choice but to play 1 and 3. It's upsetting that Black is able to


live in sente just by pushing into White with 4 (if White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', then Black lives with 'd') and so is able to switch to 6, but this way Black doesn't get nearly as much territory as in the game.



*Dia. 4*

Black 67. A good move, defending the top while aiming at 'b'.

Kobayashi was probably confident of victory when he secured a nice corner territory up to 73. As the referee for this game, I followed the play closely and I was impressed by Kobayashi's maturity. His powers of judgement, as evidenced in his assessment that the influence gained from extending at 29 in Figure 1 would make up for letting White break through the corner enclosure, are admirable. For the rest of the game he doesn't play anything resembling a bad move, so my overall impression is that of a commanding win. That just goes to show how unreliable are the forecasts before a match. The seeming lack of vitality in Kato's play perhaps is an indication that the accumulated fatigue from playing title match after title match was getting to him.



*Dia. 5*

**Figure 3 (74-111).** *Not enough ko threats*

The timing of the 3-3 invasion at 74, the shoulder hit at 76 and the peep at 98 is extremely difficult; doubtless, Kato had a lot of trouble making up his mind. If I might venture an



opinion, given with the virtue of hindsight, I think that 98 may have been too late. Before playing at 80 —

*Dia. 5.* I think that White should peep at 1 now. If Black answers in the same way as in the game with 2, White can make the crude forcing moves of 3 and 5. Even supposing Black secures the corner with 6, White eats into his territory in sente with 7 and 9, and the game looks quite close. If Black 6 at 9, White plays 6 and there is a big difference from the game. In the figure, White 'a' after 98 will not be sente.




Figure 3 (74—111)  
111: ko


Alternatively, White could make the shoulder hit of 76 before 74; the sequence Black 79, White 98, Black 'b', White 74 might follow. One cannot be sure just what will happen around here.

White tried 80 and 82, but his Achilles' heel here was that he could not avail himself of the sequence for living unconditionally. Instead of White 88 —


*Dia. 6.* If White descends at 1, his group is alive, but Black plays 2 in sente, then cuts with 4 and 6. This really hurts. If White 'a' through 'e', Black plays 'f' and it's all over. The presence of 2 makes all the difference.

White has no choice but to play 88 and 90, which lets Black get a ko with the famous tesuji of 91. The problem for White is that he is at a loss for ko threats.


White 100 is played to help White make eye space if and when Black cuts him off in the centre. Provoking Black 101 is unbearably painful, but beggars can't be choosers.



*Dia. 6*



*Dia. 7*  
8: ko



*Dia. 8*

*Dia. 7.* White would dearly love to launch a challenge with 1 and 3, but Black wouldn't hesitate to start the ko with 4. Black has one ko threat at 6, but the best White can do is to play at 9. Black will finish off the ko with 10, leading to what looks like a trade with 11, but then Black polishes off the large white group with 12, so the trade is very one-sided. White is handicapped by the fact that the atari at 'a' is not a ko threat.

The way Black took his time in preparing for the ko with moves like 97 must have been galling for White. Connecting at 106 is worth about 20 points. At this stage there are no bigger moves. If White tenukis, Black easily captures the corner as in *Dia. 8*.

Starting the ko with 107 is decisive. Although White can make more of a contest regarding ko threats than in Dia. 7, there is no way that Black can lose the ko fight.

I said earlier that Kobayashi didn't play anything like a bad move in this game, but even more striking was the precision of his play. Perhaps he lost his inferiority complex towards Kato when he clinched a win in the difficult opening game.





Figure 4 (112-148)  
ko: 17, 20, 23, 26, 33, 36



Dia. 9

Figure 4 (112-148). No chance for White

I made a number of attempts to work out variations giving White a favourable game, but I couldn't come up with anything at all. That shows what a firm grip Black has on the game.

White 18 is a terrible mochikomi (loss without compensation). In order to make some use of these two stones, one is tempted to switch 20 to 1 in Dia. 9, but things look bad when Black connects at 2. The only way to avoid losing the two stones is to pull them out with 3, but then Black forces with 4 and 6 before finishing off the

ko with 8; the result only looks like putting White further behind. If White 9, Black lives with 10 and is way ahead.

Even so, White 28 is a mystery. The exchange for Black 29 makes White 32 necessary — White must feel like crying. White should simply have played 28 at 32; Black would later use 28 as a ko threat, but White would just have to grin and bear it. Still, I suppose White loses whatever he does here.

Because of White's mochikomi, Black compromises with 37 and 39. Kobayashi's positional judgement is his strong point. In contrast, Kato seems to have been so upset by his bad move at 28 that he has lost the will to fight.




Figure 5 (149-200)



Kobayashi surprises Kato by taking a two-game lead.






Figure 4 (201–247)

Figure 5 (149–200), Figure 6 (201–247). *A satisfying win for Kobayashi*

Kato's play in the endgame was a little slovenly, so the final margin was surprisingly wide. Kato Meijin displayed none of his usual strength. My impression is that there has been a shift in the balance of power between these two. But I can't believe that Kato will let himself be pushed out of the ring without offering more resistance than this.

*Black wins by 7 1/2 points.*

### Game Three

*Like the commentary on the first game presented in our previous issue, the commentary below takes the form of an interview conducted for the magazine Let's Go by the veteran go journalist Kobori Keiji. Kobayashi analyses the game with his customary lucidity and confidence, creating a commentary that should be accessible to players of all levels.*

**White:** Kobayashi Koichi

**Black:** Kato Masao

Played in Kurashiki City on 3, 4 February 1988.

**Figure 1 (1–28).** *Beware of thickness*

*Let's Go:* The general feeling was that this was a good game for White.

Kobayashi Koichi: That's not really true. Because there were two moves in the middle game that I regret.

LG: White presses Black hard with 12. This is severe. The wariuchi (splitting move) is no good, is it?






Figure 1 (1–28)



*Dia. 1: White 1 is dubious*



*Dia. 2: would White now play 'a'?*

KK: White 1 in *Dia. 1*? Black 2 to 6 would follow . . .

LG: The idea is to play a leisurely game.

KK: Ah, this is no good! Look at *Dia. 2*. After exchanging White 1 to Black 4, would you make the narrow extension to 'a', permitting Black 'b'?

LG: Oh, really? In *Dia. 1*, White has had the temerity to make that narrow extension. I've made a big step forward in understanding fuseki.


KK: Assuming that the exchange at the bottom is fair for both, White now has to be careful about the thickness of Black's ponnuki. Answering Black's approach move of 27 with 28 feels right. If White made the pincer in *Dia. 3* (next page), Black would probably exchange 2 for 3, then waste no time in invading at 4.

LG: Is this Black 4 such a good point? Well, what if Black plays there instead of 27?


KK: Letting White enclose the corner with 2 in *Dia. 4* is slack. Because White can handle

Black 3 with 4. When Black has played the diagonal-connection joseki (9 in the figure), this White 4 is possible.


LG: The fuseki is a lot of trouble. But I guess everyone knows that.



*Dia. 3: severe*



*Dia. 4: an overplay*



*Figure 2 (29-62)*

**Figure 2 (29-62). A good start by White**

KK: There are many instructive points in this figure, so I'm going to give a lot of diagrams. First, Black 33 and 35 are thick moves. The small knight's move of 36 instead of 33 is tempting, but then White 'a' (Black plays 'b') becomes a good point.

LG: When you made the 36-40 extension, most people thought that you had the superior opening.


KK: Well, I thought that I could make a game of it. It now looked as if I could kill Black's thickness.

LG: A skirmish started with 41. I imagine professionals really take a lot of trouble over this kind of fight.


KK: After White 42, the attach-and-extend combination of 44 and 46 is the right way to play here. White must not hane at 1 in *Dia. 5*.

LG: I'm not proud of this, but I'd probably hane without hesitation.

KK: After 4, Black can play 'a' later on. If White 'b', the atari of Black 'c' is painful, surely.



*Dia. 5: bad style*




*Dia. 6: the wrong timing*


LG: You peeped at 48. And Black connected at 49. The Meijin is not the kind of fool who won't connect against a peep.

KK: White can't waste any time defending the corner with 1 in *Dia. 6*, but if he peeped at 3 later, Black would answer at 4 instead of connecting.

LG: So that's why you played 48 before 50. Well, what if Black played 49 at 1 in *Dia. 7*?



*Dia. 7: if Black counters*



*Dia. 8: good for White*

KK: White will resolutely cut at 2. After Black 5, White again cuts with 6 and 8 in *Dia. 8*. The result to 14 is good for White. Because Black has to add a move in the corner.


LG: Understood, understood. Well then, White 52 next is a Kobayashi-style move that at first glance looks crude but, based on a shrewd assessment of the whole board, settles the shape. The force-force style.

KK: What are you talking about? This is not the kind of position in which you want to aim at 1 in *Dia. 9*. Even if you can lay waste to Black's




area by coming in around 'a', Black has the aji of 'b' to use in attacking the corner white group; nothing could be more stupid than giving Black a chance to use his bottom thickness.

LG: That's the lucid positional judgement I was referring to.



*Dia. 9: not worth aiming at*



*Dia. 10: too good for White*


KK: White 56 was a move I had been waiting to play for quite a while, but Black 57 was a move worthy of Kato.

LG: Though he invaded, this stone was swallowed up by 58 to 62. Even the Meijin is human.


KK: You don't get it, do you? White has been outplayed here. If Black plays 57 at 1 in *Dia. 10*, White is very happy to extend to 2. Black 3 is squashed by White 4, so this is all White's territory. So, if you ask why Black invaded, the answer is that after White 58 he can play the sequence in *Dia. 11*; he wins the fight after 5. Therefore, instead of 2, White will attach at 'a', making a diversionary attack against the corner. Kato figured that this would be bad for Black, so he played 59. White now had no choice about 60 and 62; he had been forced willy-nilly to make territory here. Black still had the aji of Black 'c'. You've got things back to front.

LG: ...?

KK: What I'm trying to say is that I was tricked into playing 58. I had to play on a wider scale, attaching at 1 in *Dia. 12*. Would Black answer that at 'a' or 'b'? It's very troublesome to work out what is likely to happen, but one thing that's clear is that White 1 is the fighting move.




*Dia. 11: Black's threat*



*Dia. 12: the fighting move*

LG: Play on a wider scale — that's a good way to put it. Like the wide formation of the Soviet team in the ice hockey at the Calgary Olympics. With White 58 to 62, it's surprising how cramped White's position has become. I don't claim to understand what the Kisei has said, but I'm sure our readers will be more intelligent.

Actually, I had misinterpreted the block at 62. I was convinced that it was a sign of outstanding positional judgement and it reminded me of a Shusaku game. Shusaku blocked at 1 in *Dia. 13*. He made a comment to the effect that this was good enough, as White was ahead in territory. [This game is the 17th in the 30-game series with Ota Yuzo. It is given on pp. 276–281 of *Invincible: The Games of Shusaku*.]



*Dia. 13: Shusaku's block*

KK: That's a famous game. But in this case there's no comparison. Shusaku would be furious. White 62 was just a move I played because I had to.

LG: You're fond of Dosaku and Shusaku, aren't you?

KK: Yes, of the players of Meijin class of the past, they're the ones I study the most. I think they were really strong.

LG: It's a pity there's no one like them among the top players of today. If there were, we'd just blow China away. Oh, perhaps I've gone too far.

KK: No, that's OK. You may be right.

LG: Taken individually, the tournament pros are OK, but as far as the awareness of being standard-bearers of a country with a proud go tradition goes, the Edo-period players were stronger and more to be depended upon.

KK: Do you think so?

LG: Sorry for getting off the track. In short, all I ask of the Japanese representatives is that they win some.

KK: Of course, I'll do my best.




Figure 3 (63-100)

Figure 3 (63-100). Kato has the upper hand.

KK: In this figure, Kato played a very skilful forcing sequence from 63 to 70. It felt as if Black was able to make the extension to 69 in sente.


LG: Is White 64 also the Kobayashi style?

KK: No, I'm eliminating the aji of a black contact play at 66. Even so, it would have been better to play 64 at 1 in *Dia. 14*. Black rips off a stone with 2 to 8, but when I studied this variation later, I found that it was a little favourable for White.


LG: Is the extension of 1 really such a good point?

KK: It eliminates the threat of Black 'a' through 'e'. When I missed this variation, the game became a close contest. Or perhaps Black took the lead.

LG: In short, White has played two dubious moves: 58 in the previous figure and 64 here.



*Dia. 14: better for White*



*Dia. 15: not deep enough*

KK: Black continued to play well, expanding his position with 71 and cleverly forcing with 73. I plunged in deep at 88, but it seemed to me that I couldn't win unless I went in this far. A move like White 1 in *Dia. 15*, letting White enclose the top with 2, would not be enough.

LG: When White invades deeply, Black can't just docilely answer him. The Meijin launched a fierce attack and the endgame was full of incident. Unfortunately, we don't have room to analyse the fighting in detail.


The fight pits Kato's attack against Kobayashi's defence. In the end, Kobayashi survived the attack and won the game. Could you briefly touch on the main points?

KK: White has to defend at 98 in answer to Black 97. The opinion was expressed that Black could have tried playing 97 at 'a'. That gives *Dia. 16*. The corner group is not unconditionally alive,




but after Black 1 to 9 I would capture at 10. Black puts the large group into ko, but White can survive because he has a lot of adjacent ko threats. If he gets the ponnuki, this should be good for White.

LG: The question now is whether the centre white group can escape without damage. At this stage Kato had used less than half his time.



*Dia. 16: not afraid of 1 and 3*



*Figure 4 (101-130)*

**Figure 4 (101-130).** Kato misses his last chance.


LG: The centre group is now connected up to the bottom, but from what I hear, Black had a chance to win after this.

KK: I'm afraid there's no way to explain it simply — it's a complicated variation. The losing move is Black 13. When White extends at the vital point of 14, he is assured of victory. Black 13 has to be the atari at 1 in *Dia. 17*. If White defends the bottom group with 2 at 'a', then


Black puts the right-side group into ko with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. White will therefore play 2 and 4, but the cut at 5 is then a clever move. If White 6 at 11, Black kills the large group above with Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', followed by the bamboo joint of 9. White has no choice but to atari on top, permitting Black 13. Black then secures a large territory at the top with 19 and 21.

LG: Black has done very well.

KK: This variation is a clear win for Black.



*Dia. 17: the win that Kato missed*



*Figure 5 (131-164)*

**Figure 5 (131-164).** Three in a row

LG: It was probably hard for Kato Meijin to reconcile himself to this loss. But after winning three in a row, you lost a game; the possibility of a recovery by Kato must be making you nervous.

KK: It's not a question of starting to get nervous now. Kato's the kind of opponent to make

me nervous right from the start. Anyway, at present I'm devoting myself completely to this match.

*Black resigns after White 164.*  
(*'Let's Go'*, April 1988.)



*Kobayashi looks happy: he could hardly have dreamed before the series started that he would take a three-game lead so easily. Hashimoto Shoji and Yamabe are at a loss to explain how it happened.*


## Game Four

**White:** Kato Masao

**Black:** Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 17, 18 February 1988 in Hakodate City.


*Commentary by Tozawa Akinobu 9-dan.*



*Dia. 1: Kobayashi style*

**Figure 1 (1-21).** *Kobayashi's obstinate move meets with disapproval.*

At the start of the game he was sniffing; on the second day he had a racking cough. Kato was in terrible shape physically for the fourth game, but the result was a convincing win. I think that this victory may prove to be a springboard for a recovery.



*Figure 1 (1-21)*


Instead of 8, the counter-pincer of 1 in *Dia. 1* is often played. If Black attaches at 'a' in response, White 2, Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' . . . However, Kobayashi won't play this way. Forestalling White by switching to 2 is a



favourite tactic of his; he is content to submit tamely when White presses at 3, as he takes profit up to 8. This is a very shrewd strategy typical of Kobayashi, which is not to say that there is anything wrong with this diagram for White. The correct way to interpret White 8 is probably to see it as a fighting counter that denies the opponent the chance to play his favourite strategy.

You often see the push of 10 these days. In the old days you would have been scolded for playing a move like this (pushing along the 6th line), but White is pinning his hopes on the pincer of 14. It just shows you how times have changed.

In the pressroom the blocking move of 15 was vilified. It is a strong move which denies White the option of linking up (if Black simply jumps to 17 with 15, then White links up with White 'a', Black 'b', White 15), but in a TV report on the game Takemiya commented: 'I'll never play this kind of move as long as I live.' It's certainly a move one has doubts about. [Ishida Yoshio commented on the TV program mentioned above that it's a greedy move: Black is trying to take more than his fair share by playing on the side and at the bottom.]



*Dia. 2: risky*


The strategy most appealing to amateurs here would be to push up resolutely with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 2*, then to press at 7. But this is a risky way of playing. Enclosing the bottom area after White 10 would be too small in scale; on the other hand, if Black keeps pushing up with 'a' etc., he has to worry about an invasion at the bottom.

How about the taisha in *Dia. 3*? The frontal clash up to 17 is just what Black wants. That means that the Kitani joseki in *Dia. 4* may be best. My conclusion is that the result to 14 would be reasonable for both sides.


Note that when White pushes up with 18 and 20, the balance of power between Black 7, 15, and 17 and White 14 and 16 is clearly favourable to White.



*Tozawa Akinobu 9-dan, the referee for the 4th game and the author of our commentary, is one of the senior disciples of the Kitani school. In 1974 he won the 'Kido' prizes for best winning percentage and most successive wins. In 1975 he toured China, scoring 5-2, and this year he visited Warsaw.*




*Dia. 3: good for Black*




*Dia. 4: best*


I don't like the way that with 21 Black is following one step behind White. The opinion was expressed in the pressroom that Black 21 should have been at 1 in *Dia. 5* (next page). If White 2, Black resolutely cuts at 3 and drags White into a fight. Up to Black 7, it's two black stones versus two white stones, but if you agree that the position in the game is bad for Black, then you have to say that he had no choice but to follow this variation.



*Dia. 5: a preferable strategy*



*Figure 2 (22-53)*  
*50: ko*



*Dia. 6: best for 25*

### Figure 2 (22-53). Kato takes the lead.

The attachment of 22 is well-timed. If played later, Black might be able to resist with 23 at 42. White now extends at 24 — always he is one step ahead. He has got off to a good start.

In this game Kobayashi's moves were the only

ones that became the butt of criticism. The natural-looking move of 25 caused all kinds of controversy. Forcing with 26 and jumping to 28 are a good combination: Black is at a loss for an answer.

Someone suggested descending at 42 instead of 25, but one has doubts about this when White turns at 'a'. Black would then continue with 31, but White would seem to have no grounds for dissatisfaction.


From among various candidates, the most promising is apparently Black 1 in *Dia. 6*. White will naturally cut with 2 and 4, but after the standard sequence to 14 Black could split White into two with 'a', presenting White with a difficult decision. Being behind, Black should welcome a fight that complicates the game.

It was also suggested that Black could play 27 at 31, letting White link up with 'b', but Black would not be happy with this.

Black uses the sacrifice of 31 to fix up his shape up to 39, but White gets considerable thickness from the ponnuki. Already at this early stage White is ahead.

Kato was in really bad shape from his cold, which was getting worse instead of better, and I heard that he hardly slept a wink the night before the game, but on the go board he was in fine form: every move was right on target. Inexplicably, Kobayashi was the one making all the dubious moves. Perhaps, with final victory in the series so close, he was trying too hard . . .

Black 41 is another questionable move: it has no effect on White. In this position, Black must make a leaning (that is, diversionary) attack, attaching at 1 in *Dia. 7* and continuing with 3 and 5. If White cuts with 6, Black has a strong answer with 7 and 9 — White won't have time to capture at 19. He can save his right-side group with the ko up to 20, but this result gives Black much better chances than in the game.




*Dia. 7: a leaning attack*  
*18: ko*



Because Black made slack shape with 41, it became that much easier for White to start the ko with 42 and 44. Well, then — Black is short of ko threats. Where is he going to find them?

Black is perfectly aware that 51 and 53 are inadequate, but they are the best he's got. Black 'c' is probably the standard continuation after 51, but for White to settle his group with 'd' would just simplify the game even further.



*Dia. 8: rejected*


*Dia. 8.* Some players examined the ko threats of 1 and 3, which seek to secure influence in the centre, but this was rejected. White invades at 4 and Black has no prospect of coming out of the fight unscathed. When you're building on a bad foundation...

**Figure 3 (54–100).** *Kato continues to have his way.*


White has nothing to worry about when he pokes his head out with 58 and 60. So far from coming under pressure, he builds ever more massive influence by attacking with 66 and 68 — the game is going great for him.

And White 76 is a telling blow. White now sets about deciding the game.

Black 87. Black would like to be able to extend at 1 in *Dia. 9*, but it's a little unreasonable. White will, of course, have a crack at killing the large group with 2. The continuation to 23 seems to be best; Black manages to get a ko, but unfortunately he is still short of the all-important ko threats. White, in contrast, has a number of strong ko threats: White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', for one, and also White 'd' and White 'e'.



*Figure 3 (54–100)*






*Dia. 9: unreasonable for Black*

Presumably after reading out this diagram and its variations, Kobayashi added the reinforcement at 89, in the hope that this would keep him in the game. However, when White blocks at 90, the position does after all seem to be bad for him.



Later Kobayashi commented: 'Black 91 was the cause of my loss; I should have extended one line further, to 1 in *Dia. 10* (next page).' But can Black really expect a better result this way? After White 2 to 6, the placement at 8 is severe. Even if Black lives after White 14, he seems to have no chance of matching White in territory.





Kobayashi stakes the game on the fight in the top right corner, but when White raps him on the head with 6, you get the feeling that the issue has been decided. It would be nice for Black if he could extend at 1 in *Dia. 11* instead of 5, but he would face a tough fight after 2 and 4. Alternatively, if Black 1 at 'a', escaping at 2 works for White.

One more point: note the atari of White 38. It won't hurt to remember this as a tesuji for when you want to keep sente.



The final margin was a big one. There are hardly any bad moves by White to be found in this game —it's a crushing win for Kato. I was convinced that he had regained form, but he suffered an upset loss in the final game. He's still not the old Kato. Observing this game as referee, I got the impression that Kato was tired. The Judan title has started without giving him any



time to rest. I hope that he can get back in shape and show us some good go.

*White wins by 8 1/2 points.*  
(‘Kido’, April 1988)

## Game Five

**White:** Kobayashi Koichi

**Black:** Kato Masao

Played in Nagoya City on 24, 25 February 1988.

*Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.*

Looking back on the series, the key game was the second one. The game went just the way I planned it — in the opening I sacrificed the corner territory to build thickness and I was able to win playing an attacking game — so at one stroke my Kato complex was blown away.

Even so, the fifth game was almost a loss for me, so luck played a large part in my successful title defence. If I had lost this game, the flow of the series would have changed, leading, perhaps, to a miserable result for me . . . Just to think of it makes me shudder.




Figure 1 (1-50)


### Figure 1 (1-50). An unavoidable fight

Black 1 and 3 are the same as in the third game, but it's quite unusual for Kato to play the star point these days. Apparently it was half a year since the last time he'd played it.

Black 9 and 11 are part of the same strategy. In the same fuseki in the fourth game I played the shoulder hit of 43 instead of 9.

When I played at 12, I fully realized that 9 would work well for Black. Even so, the idea of

avoiding a fight with 1 to 9 in *Dia. 1* is distasteful. The only thing is that I could probably have used 12 to invade at 40 as a probe.




*Dia. 1: avoiding the fight*


When Black extends at 21, White can't avoid the fight from 22. After Black hanes at 39, White can't do anything with these stones. However, extending to 40, aiming at White 'a', was the strategy I had decided on beforehand. White forces Black to add a stone at 41, then attaches at 42.

Note that from Black's point of view, exchanging 'b' for White 'c' would be very bad, as it solidifies White.

Black 43. If at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White is ready with the cut of 2. The continuation to 16 could be expected; White lives with good aji at the bottom and we have a different game.



*Dia. 2: White is happy.*



*Dia. 3: preferable for 44*

I thought that 44 was the most straightforward move, but it was unthinking. Actually, I hadn't realized that after 48 Black could extend at 49. Black 49 feels heavy, so I expected something like the knight's move at 'd'; when Black played 49, I was taken aback by its forcefulness. Instead of 44, attaching at 1 in *Dia. 3* would have

been more interesting; if the moves to 11 followed, this would be superior to the game.





Figure 2 (51-75)




Dia. 4: attacking White's base

### Figure 2 (51-75). Tough going for White

My plans had been upset and with 52 I set out upon a journey full of hardship. The game was bad for me, though just by a little; the going was tough because I just couldn't manage to close that small gap.

The status of the white group at the bottom up to 56 later becomes a problem point, but at this stage, though I did feel a certain amount of anxiety, I had read out that at the least the group could live.

I wondered about Black 59. Driving the white group out into the centre by attacking with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* enables Black to develop more solidly and takes more territory. This is how I would have played.



Dia. 5: a better strategy

White 72 and 74 were also dubious. When White lives at the bottom, he will have to exchange White 'a' for Black 'b', which will weaken the white group on the right side. With that in mind, strengthening White with 72 and 74 looked ridiculously big to me, but I was being too nervous. The biggest move here was, after all, White 1 in *Dia. 5*. If Black 2, White could reinforce with good aji with 3; if Black 4, he defends at 5. White 'a' would be big, so Black 'b' could be expected next, but then competing territorially with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' would be reasonable for White.

When Black extends to 75, the game is still a little unfavourable for White.





Figure 3 (76-114)

### Figure 3 (76-114). The game turns in White's favour.

Invading at 76 seems to be the move here.






*Dia. 6: changing the timing*

The reason why I ignored 79 and switched to 80 was not because things would have gone badly for me at the top. After White 80 to Black 89, White 76 and 78 have become forcing moves. A comparison with *Dia. 6*, in which White uses 76 to cut immediately at 1 shows why. If White invaded at 11 after first playing the sequence on the side, Black would now answer at 12 and White would be helpless to do anything with his invading stone. If instead of 12 Black were to play 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c', White could certainly claim that 11 and 'b' are forcing moves.

White would prefer not to make the exchange of 90 for 91 if at all possible, but he has no choice. If he simply attaches at 92, Black will hane at 94; if then White 90, Black won't answer at 91 but instead will atari 92.

It seems to be out of the question for Black to descend at 92 instead of 91. White would move out at 91 and if Black didn't capture him he would lose. Even so, I was worried that Kato might try this . . .




*Dia. 7: a powerful strategy — but risky?*

I sealed White 94 before time was up for the first day, the reason being that I couldn't make up my mind whether to take up position with White 104 when Black played 95. In the end, I decided that Black 'a' would be too severe, so I added a stone at 96.

Black 97. Enclosing the centre with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7* would have been a very strong strategy. Presumably Kato passed up this variation because he lacked confidence. Once Black sets out to enclose the corner, White 'a' becomes sente, so White reaps the advantage of eliminating his worries about his bottom group. You might wonder what the actual territorial balance would be if Black followed *Dia. 7*, but that's such a difficult question that I have to beg off answering it.

After the game Kato commented that Black 101 was a bad move. He said that it would have been better to enclose the centre on as large a scale as possible with 1 in *Dia. 8*. If White 2, Black gets too big a centre with 3, so White will probably set out to reduce it with 'a'. I wouldn't have liked this variation, so I was grateful for 101.



*Dia. 8: more positive*

White 106. Setting up a geta with White 111 would be slack. A difference of one line here makes a big difference to the size of Black's centre territory.

I had my doubts about Black 107 to 113. These moves set up the capture of three white stones for later, but Black's centre territory was reduced, so I doubt that Black made any profit here. I felt that up to 114 the game had turned in my favour.






Figure 4 (115-135)

ko: 29, 32, 35



Dia. 9: correct for 16



Dia. 10: the move Kato missed

#### Figure 4 (115-135). A narrow escape

I expected Black 15 sooner or later. If only this white group lives, if only I don't make a mistake here, the game would be mine: such was my state of mind at the time. The irony of it is that I made a great effort here, put in some long, hard thought — and went wrong.


I was convinced that Black would answer 16 at 'a', whereupon, according to my analysis, I could live with a double ko by blocking at 'b'. But when Black cut at 17, I was astonished. 'Ouch,' I thought, 'I've made it a ko.'

If White plays 16 at 1 in Dia. 9, the group is alive. When Black plays 2, White has the clever counter of 3, and the result to 9 is a seki.


Kato took his time and after careful consideration played 19. I thought that he had read it

all out and that I was finished, but Black 19 failed to decide the issue. Actually, Kato had overlooked a more devastating move.

The game would have been over if Black had played 19 at 1 in Dia. 10. If White 2, Black 3 to 11 reduce White to one large four-point eye. He captures White cleanly. Instead of 2 —



Dia. 11: a bad ko for White



Dia. 12: White wins the semeai

Dia. 11. If White 2 here, Black 3 and 5 give a ko, but with the vital difference from the game that the marked stones are captured, so to all intents and purposes it is a one-sided ko in Black's favour.

In the figure, it becomes possible for White to connect at 30.


Even so, at the time I thought that I had no answer when Black descended at 33. However, after pondering the matter for about 30 minutes, I discovered the exquisite tesuji of 34. When I found this move, I felt like a drowning man who manages to get one hand upon the embankment.

The significance of 34 in response to the ko threat of 33 is that this is perfect timing for taking a bite at the corner black group. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 12 with 35, White answers the ko threat with 2; if Black ends the ko with 3 and 5, White plays 6 and wins the semeai (capturing race). Alternatively —


Dia. 13. If Black makes the diagonal connection of 1, White plays 2 as preparation for resisting with a ko in the corner; he now ends the ko with 4, then fights the corner ko.

Both variations are unfavourable for Black, so he wastes no time recapturing the ko with 35.






*Dia. 13: bad for Black*



*Figure 5 (136-180)*



*Dia. 14*


8: ko

### Figure 5 (136-180). Finally, an upset

When Black ataried at 37, I thought for a moment that I could connect at 39 and win the fight, but my joy was premature. *Dia. 14*. If White does connect at 1, Black has a good answer at 2. After Black 8, White has no ko threats, so he will have to play White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', so he loses the extra stone he played at 1.

That means that the trade with 40 and 41 is correct. In this result, however, the corner white group has made profit while living and White has gained sente, so overall there's no saying who has gained in this fight. *Dia. 15* shows what would

have happened if White had made a trade immediately with 34 in Figure 4.




*Dia. 15: Black wins the semeai.*

*Dia. 15*. If White ends the ko with 1, Black cuts at 2. White can continue with 3 and 5, but Black connects at 6 and wins the semeai after 11: his eye is larger than White's. Please confirm for yourself the difference between this semeai and the one in *Dia. 12*.


Anyway, White has now turned it into a close game — he has been granted a reprieve.

We now went into the large endgame, and in my opinion Black 53 and 55 may have been the losing moves. Kato may have believed that the gap at 55 gave him bad aji, but if he thought he had time to worry about aji he must have been a little overoptimistic about his game. Putting the lid on Black's territory with 53 and 55 is worth about three points, but Black loses more by the exchange for the diagonal connection of White 56. What I'm trying to say is that Black would have won if he had used 53 to force with 1 in *Dia. 16*, then defend his side territory with 3.



*Dia. 16: Black wins.*


I think that White moved into the lead when he played 58. Putting aside the failure to play the sente move of 1 in *Dia. 16*, Black would still have had a chance of winning if only he hadn't played 53 and 55. The reason why they are so reprehensible is that they give White the sente move of 66, which sets up a big continuation at 'a'.



*Dia. 17: a more comfortable win for White*

However, the hane of 70 was dubious. The biggest move is 1 in *Dia. 17*. If Black 2, White plays 3 to 9 in the centre, clearly giving him a win.

White 80. White 'b' is more profitable.



*Figure 6 (181-200)*

**Figure 6 (181-200), Figure 7 (201-261). A cliff-hanger to close the series**

None of the first four games had been close, so I expected a half-pointer in this game. It was only by good luck that I was on the winning side of it.


I have to agree that Kato was tired. I've had the same experience; in his case, he's been appearing continuously in title matches for the past year or two, so his fatigue must have mounted up. In contrast to Kato, I was in peak condition.

I feel lonely with just one title, so my target for the future is to take back some of the titles I have lost. Recently I've been engaged solely in

title defences, so just for a change I would like to be the attacker.

*White wins by half a point.*

(*'Kido'*, April 1988. Kisei report translated by John Power.)



*Figure 7 (201-261)*

*58: connects (right of 10); 61: connects (below 59)*



Kobayashi: In most of the games in this series when I took the lead I did so by playing thickly and focussing on attack. Both Kato and I are regarded as territorial players, so this might seem a little surprising. However, you should remember that I started out as an attacking player, just as Kato did. I have the feeling that this might be my lucky year. But I'm not counting my chickens — after all, in game after game I'm faced with formidable opponents. All I can do is to think about how to win the next game.



# Barbara Calhoun: America's Ambassador of Go

*Jonathan Wood*

I spoke with Barbara Calhoun during the 1988 World Amateur Go Championship in the Nihon Ki-in building in Tokyo. We carved out a small corner of a playing room and amid the clatter and chatter of a go class for elderly Japanese women we talked about her interest in go and how it is doing in the United States.

It would be hard to find someone more qualified to be America's 'ambassador of go' than Barbara Calhoun. In the everyday world she is a manager at an employee benefits consulting company. In her free time, when she's not singing in an Irish band, she is playing go, working for the American Go Association, or having dinner and watching movies with her go friends. By the time this magazine reaches the reader, she will be president of the American Go Association, as she is unopposed in elections currently being held. As treasurer of the AGA for the past eight years, a member of its International Liaison Committee, and its representative on the Board of Directors of the International Go Federation for 1988-9, Calhoun is no stranger to diplomacy. She has attended four World Amateur Go Championships in Japan and China. 'I really enjoy meeting the players from everywhere and I also enjoy seeing how the relationships among countries in the world get mirrored, questions like can Chinese Taipei participate or not [it can], and how under the new openness in Russia they have sent WAGC representatives in the past three years,' she said.

Calhoun was 22 when she saw her first go board, but it wasn't until six years later, in 1978, that she really learnt how to play. Her boyfriend at the time taught her and she was immediately attracted by 'the enormous complexity. I had no idea what was going on.' While this is exactly what turns many would-be players off, Calhoun, a veteran chess and Scrabble player, was spurred on. 'I've probably played go almost every day since then,' she said.

Soon after learning, Calhoun met current AGA president Terry Benson and 6-dan Don Wiener at a party. Wiener offered to play her giving her 17 handicap stones. 'At the end of the game, I couldn't believe it. I don't think there was a living black group on the board,' she recalled



*At the Seattle Go Congress, August 1986  
(Photo by Phil Straus)*

with a smile. She asked Wiener what made go interesting to him and he told her that if she gave him any philosophic principle, he could illustrate it on the go board. That made her want to find out what go was all about.

'At any level, once one has some idea of what's going on, go's ability to be a mirror of situations in life is readily apparent. That is what's kept me playing. It's a wonderful model for the natural order of things.'

Calhoun finds most go players to be interesting people and 'the commitment required to get reasonably good means they are intent and focused and tend to have other interesting aspects of themselves,' she believes.

She doesn't like players who take a long time to play or those who get really upset when they lose. 'Playing faster is wonderful advice for weak amateurs. The people who play so slow tend to be in love with their stones,' said Calhoun, who currently carries a 1-kyu ranking in the AGA.

She is joined by over a thousand other AGA members, many belonging to one of 35 chapters. 'There are probably 10,000 reasonably regular players in the U.S.,' she said, though there could be as many as 100,000 who know the rules of go.



*Enjoying a cigar break with Terry Assael and Don Wiener during the 3rd U.S. Go Congress (Massachusetts, 1987) (Photo by Phil Straus.)*

Go has a bright future in the States, according to Calhoun. 'I think we're on the brink of really expanding our membership significantly,' thanks to the U.S. Go Congress and Japanese professional title matches being brought there. On a broader scale, 'people are becoming more aware of Japan and China as forces to be reckoned with,' she said, which helps create interest in things connected to their cultures.

The AGA is an all-volunteer organization. Its only income is membership dues and three-fourths of these fund *The American Go Journal*, a quarterly containing go news about the U.S., as well as game commentaries and instructional material. The AGA sees itself mainly as a network for go communities.

Calhoun commented that one of their main interests, but one for which they lack resources, is education. 'In the U.S., schools are all organized on the local level, so each city has its own school system. To break into this is a slow, grass-roots kind of process.' Without people in the area who have an interest in go and who are willing to help with the work, there is little the AGA can do to get go into the schools. They have created a position of national schools coordinator and are looking for someone to fill it.

One boost for go in the United States has been the holding of three games from Japanese professional title matches there. As a member of the AGA's International Liaison Committee, Calhoun was heavily involved in the arrangements for these games. 'When the Meijin [game] was in New York in September 1987, we had two articles in *The New York Times* in the week they were there, which is very, very significant. Local newscasters came, and one of the stations is planning a feature based on their Meijin footage.'

One reason the games received more attention than might otherwise have been expected was that 'the Japanese business communities support them. This gets the attention of American companies and the press,' Calhoun said.

The relationship between the American and Japanese go associations is quite cordial. It is based on promoting not only go but international friendship as well. The Nihon Ki-in supports the U.S. Go Congress by sending one or more professionals to attend; in 1987, a delegation of 11 professionals and amateurs, including Sakata Eio, Honorary Honinbo, made the trip.

A Japanese tour group of fifty or so amateurs usually also attends the Congress. Calhoun said, 'This has introduced the everyday Japanese



player to the everyday American player, which is a wonderful experience for everybody.'

The AGA isn't putting all its stones in one corner, however. Relations with the Chinese and Korean go associations are also quite friendly, and professionals from both these countries attend the U.S. Go Congress.

A tour of the U.S. by two top Chinese pros (Jiang Zhujiu, then 8-dan, and Shao Zhenzhong 7-dan) in January 1987 did more than give U.S. go players a chance to improve their game. Calhoun commented, 'One good result [of the visit] is that the Chinese go-playing community has realized that the AGA has something to offer them. [It] was a real impetus to bring the Chinese and American players together.'

'The Korean and Chinese go players tend to have their own clubs and tend to be isolated,' she continued. 'They're not as absorbed into our culture as the Japanese are. I think this is because the Japanese brought go to the West. The American players have learned go by the Japanese rules and their introduction to go terms was Japanese words that everyone uses, like atari, sente, gote, and others.' Since Calhoun started playing ten years ago, however, she's noticed that the Korean and Chinese communities have become more integrated into the American mainstream.

Relations with other members of the IGF are good but spotty. 'We exchange journals, so we know what's going on in each other's country, but that's about it.'

Of the four Western players to become professionals, three are from the U.S. Although Calhoun could give no reason for this, she was happy to say a little about each one.

James Kerwin 1-dan, Nihon Ki-in: 'He's one of our most popular teachers. He's been at every go congress and he always packs the house. His ability to translate professional ideas into a language American players, especially weaker ones, can understand is wonderful.'

Michael Redmond 5-dan, Nihon Ki-in: 'Our premier pro. It's an inspiration to many of our younger players to see what Michael's accomplished.' Like Kerwin, 'he has the ability to speak to us at a very high [go] level, but really in our language.'

Janice Kim 1-dan, Hankuk Kiwon: 'She's our youngest pro, in fact still a teenager. She writes a column for the *AGA Journal* and is now living in New York and teaching go there.'

There are no real plans for any kind of American professional system, according to Calhoun, because 'we don't see that it would be possible for people to earn their living at go in the U.S. for a long time to come.'



*Playing a teaching game with a professional in Osaka, May 1985. Seated next to Barbara is Richard Granville (U.K.)*



*Organizing the Fujitsu Cup qualifying tournament in February 1988. Looking on is Bob Ryder and in the foreground is Thomas Tu, U.S. representative in the IBM Tournament.*

Something that might pave the way for that, but, even more, be of enormous help to the average go player, is corporate sponsorship by American companies. 'Sheraton Hotels would like to help go and are sponsoring an amateur tournament and exhibition. IBM supported the 1985 European Go Congress in Holland and IBM Japan is sponsoring a tournament in Japan. It would be nice for IBM America to sponsor something here,' said Calhoun.

The AGA has just created a fund-raising committee and will focus on education, trying to get companies to sponsor school programs. They would also like to have sponsors for the U.S. Go Congress, if only to help out with transportation expenses, which can be prohibitively high in the U.S.

There aren't a lot of women go players in any country, West or East, and Calhoun has some pithy comments on this fact. 'It's the different ways men and women are brought up. Women aren't encouraged to play competitive sports as children. Many women who have learned go have said they can't deal with the competitive aspect of it. [They] often don't view competition as a healthy or positive thing.'

'Another reason,' she continued, 'is that after they get in their twenties, many women will start raising families, which is more time-consuming for

them than for their husbands. Also, women tend not to go to go clubs.'

When Calhoun started playing, there were only two other regular women players. 'A woman had to be a little thick-skinned to walk into a room with 30 men and sit down and try to compete. If a woman walks in and sees another woman or two playing, she'll be more inclined to stay.' The Brooklyn Go Club, which Calhoun belongs to, has 12 women members out of 30. One possible reason for such a high percentage is that they usually play in people's homes, with families welcome.



*Receiving a birthday present (a copy of a mammoth new joseki dictionary) from Mr. Oeda on 20 September 1987 at the American Meijin Tournament.*

'In chess and bridge and Scrabble, which have organized leagues in the States, there are proportionately many more women players than there are in go. I think our numbers will increase a lot. There are only about ten dan-level women that I'm aware of in the U.S.,' said Calhoun.

Calhoun herself likes the competitiveness of go. She also finds it 'meditative and absorbing,' as well as a 'source of friends.' She loves promoting go and is looking forward to its increasing popularity in the United States. When go is 'entrenched in schools,' and when 'more women learn to play and families play go together, then go will spread in the U.S.,' she said. With such a strong combination of vision and commitment, Barbara Calhoun truly is America's ambassador of go.




## 36 Tesuji Patterns: Answers

Continued from page 33.


### Answer to Problem 7

*Dia. 1.* Black 1 is the tesuji for linking up over a gap of three lines. Confirm for yourself that White now has no way of preventing Black from linking up.


*Dia. 2.* Black 1 also secures a link, in similar fashion to 1 in Dia. 1, but it is not correct. Let's assume that later a ko fight breaks out and White plays 2 and 4 in exchange for losing the ko. It's obvious now that Black 1 has caused Black an unnecessary loss.



*Dia. 1: correct*



*Dia. 2: bad*




*Dia. 3: wrong*

*Dia. 3.* Black 1 may be the centre of symmetry, but blindly following the proverb leads to disaster. Black loses his connection after the tesuji of White 2.


### Answer to Problem 8

*Dia. 1.* The key move is to wedge in at 1. Black's strong point here is his stone on the edge (the marked stone); Black 1 is the way to make best use of it.


*Dia. 2.* If White 2, Black 3 forces White 4. Black then plays his follow-up tesuji of 5.




*Dia. 1: the first tesuji*



*Dia. 2: the second tesuji*



*Dia. 3: connected*



*Dia. 4: wrong timing*


*Dia. 3.* If White 6, the descent to 7 makes use of the marked stone: White can't intercept.

*Dia. 4.* Black must not change the timing. If he plays at 1 first, the 'tesuji' of 3 is no longer a tesuji. Black is helpless after White 4.


### Answer to Problem 9

*Dia. 1.* Dropping down to the second line is the tesuji. It is called the 'knight's move connection', because it is a knight's move from both the black groups. This tesuji often comes up in actual play. Black's shape may look a little frail, but he need have no worries.


*Dia. 2.* If White 2, Black must hane at 3. White now has no follow-up (if White descends to the second line, Black cuts to the left of 1 and wins the corner fight).




*Dia. 1: correct shape*



*Dia. 2: safe*



*Dia. 3: safe*



*Dia. 4: wrong*


*Dia. 3.* If White 2, Black simply pulls back at 3 and has no problems.

*Dia. 4.* Attempting to link up with a hane at 1 will lead to a setback. White makes a cut at 2, sacrificing the stone to separate the black groups with 4 and 6.

('Let's Go', March 1983)


## 36 Life and Death Patterns

*Kato Masao*




*Pattern 7: White to play*

How does White make his second eye? This is not a tricky problem, but there is a complication after he lives.



*Pattern 8: White to play*

White does not have enough room to make two eyes, so he has to exploit the weakness in Black's position. The key is using his corner stone in the right way.



*Pattern 9: Black to play*

If Black tries to expand his eye space, he will be tripped up by his shortage of liberties. He has to find the vital point inside his group, but that's not so easy.

*Answers on page 62.*

## Further Poems of Po Lien-yi

*by Donald L. Potter*

Po Lien-yi (1043–1129) lived during one of the culturally richest periods of Chinese history. He was born in the same year, 1043, that the great reformer Fan Chung-yen (989–1052) assumed political leadership, and grew up during the hegemony of China's most famous reformer, Wang An-shih (1021–86), who also happened to play go. One of China's most famous poets, Su Tung-po (1037–1101), and the great historian Ou-yang Hsiu (1007–72) were fond of go and left poems on the subject. Go was popular with the T'ang royal family and also among the Sung emperors, especially Hui-tsung (r. 1101–26).

The Confucian ideal of the literate, universal man included mastery of the classics and skill in calligraphy, painting and poetry. Ability in music and skill at go were also normal accomplishments

during the T'ang (618–907) and Sung (960–1279). It is not a coincidence that most of the great officials of the 11th century were go players and left poetry as proof of their enthusiasm. What a comparison these great literate leaders of medieval China make to the modern actors on the political stage!

While the Sung may have been intellectually the most splendid dynasty, it was the least so militarily. At the beginning of the Sung, an altaic tribe founded the Liao dynasty (947–1125), which controlled north China, including modern Peking and all of Manchuria. In 1114 another altaic tribe, the Ju-chen, attacked the Liao. Allied with the Sung, they destroyed the Liao and then turned on their sinic allies, capturing the 'Eastern Capital' (Tung Ching or modern K'ai-feng), and the royal family in 1126. This great dis-



aster is the background of the last of Po's poems, which can be dated 1126, three years before the author's death.

One wonders why Fang, at such an age, would have been in charge of capital troops. 'On his way south' means exile to a very hot and un-

wholesome environment where life is short. No doubt because of his age he is being exiled, not executed.

The first poem was obviously written during Po's service in the capital around 1090, the other three during his reclusive retirement.

### *Discretion*

Last week I played the Chief Secretary of the Board of Rites and won.  
He advanced me one rank.  
This week I lost.  
He advanced me two ranks.  
Does not victory lie in discretion?

### *Conversation*

A Taoist adept passed through our village.  
He pontificated, 'Go is like a conversation between two sages.'  
After I lost all four corners I wondered  
If he were not doing too much of the talking.

### *Solitude*

Mt. Wu is enveloped by heavy clouds.  
Fragrant mist drifts through my lonely study window.  
No one is in the garden,  
But still I hear the sharp click of intelligent tetsuki.

### *Adversity*

Our Eastern Capital has fallen.  
General Fang stops on his way south.  
Though younger than I, we graduated in the same year.  
Our eyes are riveted to the board.  
It is not dew which moistens each side.




## 36 Life and Death Patterns: Answers

*Continued from page 60.*


### Answer to Problem 7

*Dia. 1.* White 1 is obvious, but White 3 may not be. A lot of people would pull back at 'a', but Black would then kill White with a hane at 3. If Black 'b' after White 3, White of course lives easily with 'a'. A more dangerous move than Black 'b' is the placement at 'c', but Black need have no fears.


*Dia. 2.* If Black 1, the continuation is forced. White gets a seki, so all Black achieves with 1 is to reduce White's territory. If Black plays 1 at 5, White won't answer at 4, giving Black the same seki, but instead will live with White 3.




*Dia. 1: correct*



*Dia. 2: alive with seki*



*Dia. 3: dead*



*Dia. 4: ko*

*Dia. 3.* White mustn't do anything on the inside before attaching at 3. If 1 here, Black kills him with 2. If White 1 at 2, Black kills him with 1.

*Dia. 4.* The idea of White 3 is to play a ko with Black 'a'—White 7, but instead Black will make a placement at 4. White now has to play a more disadvantageous ko with 5 and 7; before connecting at 'a' (if he wins the ko), he has to add a stone next to 4, so he has to work very hard to live.

### Answer to Problem 8


*Dia. 1.* Simply descending at 1 is the best move. If Black 2, White plays 3; if Black plays 4 to spoil White's eye shape, White lives with 5 and 7. White 1 now proves its usefulness by preventing Black from linking up his three stones.

If Black connects at 'a' with 2, White plays


the same sequence with 3 to 6, then instead of 7 cuts at 'b'. If instead of 2 Black connects at 'b', White lives easily with the atari of 6.

The reason why White 1 is so effective is that it aims at either the oi-otoshi tesuji of 7 here or the sente block of White 6.


*Dia. 2.* If Black attacks on the other side with 2, White lives with 3. If Black 'a' next, he makes his second eye with 'b'; if instead Black 'b', White captures at 'a' and lives.




*Dia. 1: the tesuji*



*Dia. 2: alive*



*Dia. 3: dead*



*Dia. 4: dead*

*Dia. 3.* If White simply blocks at 1, he can't get enough room to make two eyes after Black 2. White 3 doesn't make any contribution to his eye space. This failure makes it clear why 1 has to be at 'a'.

*Dia. 4.* Without the preliminary manoeuvre of 1 in Dias. 1 and 2, White 1 here also fails. (If White 3 at 4, then Black 3.)


### Answer to Problem 9

*Dia. 1.* Black 1 serves a dual purpose: it expands Black's eye shape and it helps cover his weakness from shortage of liberties. If White 2, Black 3 is the key move; Black 5 makes miai of a second eye with 'a' or 'b'. If White plays 2 at 4, Black answers at 3 and lives in the same way. If White 2 at 3, Black lives with 4. Note that Black 3 at 'b' would be a mistake: White kills him with an atari at either 3 or 4.


*Dia. 2.* If Black 1, White attaches at the vital point of 2, then sets up a squeeze, reducing Black to one eye, with 4. If Black plays 1 at 2, White plays 1 and Black doesn't have enough room to



make two eyes.




*Dia. 1: correct*




*Dia. 2: wrong*

*Dia. 3.* If Black 1, White exploits his shortage of liberties with 2 to 6. Making a throw-in to the left of 4 doesn't help Black.



*Dia. 3: dead*




*Dia. 4: dead*


*Dia. 4.* The other kosumi, at 1 here, gives Black a dead shape after White 2. If instead Black 1 at 'a', White kills him by attaching at 'b'. ('Let's Go', March 1983.)

## Ladder Problems

*The solutions of the two problems below involve a ladder, but the main difficulty is to see how to set the ladder up. Answers are on page 64.*



*1. Black to play*



*2. White to play*

## News from China

### Ma Wins New Tournament

Ma Xiaochun 9-dan has emerged victorious in a new tournament, the Feixiang Cup ('feixiang' means 'to soar'), which is the largest-scale lightning tournament in China. Thirty-two of the top players in China participated in this five-round knockout tournament. The first surprise came when Nie Weiping was eliminated in the first round by Ma Shi 6-dan. That left the way clear for China's number two player to take the honours. In the final he defeated Liang Weitang 7-dan.

Playing conditions are 20 minutes per player, followed by 40 seconds byo-yomi. The tournament was played in Beijing from 19 to 23 July.

### Chinese National Championships

The top place-getters in the All-China Individual Championship, held in Beijing this summer, were as follows:

- 1st: Qian Yuping 9-dan
- 2nd: Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan
- 3rd: Chen Linxin 8-dan
- 4th: Tsao Dayuan 9-dan
- 5th: Jiang Jiuzhu 9-dan
- 6th: Wang Jianhong 7-dan.

Surprisingly, Ma 9-dan did not even make the top ten. Nie Weiping did not participate.

In the Women's Championship, top place was taken by Rui Naiwei 9-dan, second was Yang Hui 7-dan (who recently got married to Tsao 9-dan — they are perhaps the second-strongest go-playing couple in the world, after Nie and Kong), and third place was a tie between Kong Shangming 8-dan and Zhang Xuan 7-dan.

### 10th New Physical Education Cup League

After five rounds, the leader is Liu 9-dan, who has won all his games. Nie and Ma are close behind on 4-1. Neither has yet played Liu, so the league is still wide open.


## Ladder Problems: Answers

Continued from page 63.


### Answer to Problem 1

*Dia. 1.* Obviously Black has to start by crawling at 1. If White wants to keep on trying to capture Black, he must play 2, but Black harries him with 3 and 5. White 6 is forced: we now come to the core of the problem.


*Dia. 2.* Black gives up a stone and —




*Dia. 1: the first step*



*Dia. 2: sacrifice*



*Dia. 3: a ladder*




*Dia. 4: wrong*

*Dia. 3.* Black ataris at the other end with 9, then sets up a ladder with 11 and 13. This is a great success for Black.


*Dia. 4.* Connecting on the outside at 3 is risky. Next —

*Dia. 5.* If White blocks at 4, Black plays the 'weasel's belly' contact play and captures him anyway, but White may not be so accommodating. Instead —


*Dia. 6.* White has the tesuji of 1 (note that Black played here in Dia. 5, which proves that it is the vital point). Black is now in trouble. If Black 2, he has to block at 4 next, but White wins the corner semeai (capturing race) by descending at 5. Next —




*Dia. 5: what Black expects*



*Dia. 6: what he gets*



*Dia. 7: Black loses*



*Dia. 8: inadequate*


*Dia. 7.* Black 1 does nothing. Black is unable to atari on the top edge, so he loses the fight.

*Dia. 8.* Giving up the stones is unsatisfactory. Black may claim that he is happy with the thickness created by the ponnuki of 7, but in Dia. 3 he gets even greater thickness with profit on top of it. Of course, if he knows what's coming, White won't play 2 in Dia. 1, but having to give up the three stones is still a disaster for him.


### Answer to Problem 2

*Dia. 1.* Even without any analysis, it's obvious that White 1 is the only way to start. After 2 —


*Dia. 2.* The tesuji is White 5.




*Dia. 1*




*Dia. 2*



*Dia. 3*



*Dia. 4: success*



*Dia. 5: failure*

*Dia. 3.* White keeps chasing Black.

*Dia. 4.* White sets up a ladder in a similar fashion to the first problem.

*Dia. 5.* White 1 and 3 show a lack of ingenuity. This lets Black get a ko.





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